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Summary
The present study examined the relations between intellectual maturity and 
drawing realism in autistic children, developmentally normal children, and Down’s 
syndrome children. Intellectual maturity was assessed using tests of verbal age (the 
British Picture Vocabulary Scale), non-verbal age (Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices), the understanding of false belief (the Sally-Ann test) and, for the clinical 
groups, central coherence (the Block Design subtest of the WISC). Children were 
confronted with a series of objects to draw, namely, a striped mug, a teapot with a 
decorative pattern above its spout, a cup and saucer, and a cup with artificial flowers 
placed inside it. In all cases, the model was positioned such that its handle was hidden 
from sight and children were asked to produce a view-specific depiction. Drawing 
realism was evaluated in terms of children’s ability to avoid a commission error for the 
occluded handle (all four tasks), their portrayal of visible decorative features (the stripes 
on the mug and the pattern on the teapot), and their portrayal of contextual details (the 
saucer and the flowers). Participants additionally completed the Goodenough-Harris 
Draw-A-Person test (Harris, 1964).
For all groups, accurate omission of the occluded handles was better predicted by 
non-verbal than verbal age whereas accurate depiction of decorative and contextual 
details was better predicted by chronological age than intellectual maturity. Uniquely, the 
developmentally normal children showed a strongly negative association between verbal 
capabilities and the portrayal of the pattern on the teapot. Averaged across tasks, there 
was no evidence of precocious drawing development by the autistic children. Instead, the 
minimum levels of intellectual maturity linked with drawing realism on each of the 
measures were at least as high for the autistic sample as for the non-autistic samples. 
While the autistic children achieved similar results to the non-autistic children overall, 
however, they differed in the pattern of their drawing accuracy across the mug/cup tasks. 
Although the developmentally normal and Down’s syndrome groups experienced a 
reliable reduction in commission errors for the occluded handle from the striped mug task 
(no context) to the cup-and-saucer task (appropriate context) to the cup-and-flowers task 
(misleading context), there was no test-dependent shift in the frequency of such errors in 
the autistic group. Additionally, whereas the non-autistic children demonstrated levels of 
drawing maturity in the Draw-A-Person test that matched both their verbal and non­
verbal age, results for the autistic children were congruent only with their non-verbal age. 
The findings are discussed in terms of cognitive deficits that have been postulated to 
characterize autism.
Chapter One
1. AUTISM
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by qualitative 
impairments in reciprocal social interactions and patterns of communication and by a 
restricted, stereotyped, repetitive repertoire of interests and activities (World Health 
Organisation, 1992). Autism was first noted as a clinical syndrome by Kanner (1943) 
following his study of eleven withdrawn children who showed an indifference to the 
world and people around them. He described autism as an innate condition in which 
children suffer from an “autistic disturbance of affective contact - thus emphasising a 
profound disturbance of social functioning”.
1.1 Symptoms of autism
The Autistic Society has highlighted four essential features of autism, first, 
impairment of social interaction, second, impairment of social communication, third, 
impairment of imagination, and fourth, repetitive, stereotyped activities.
Impairment o f social interaction
The most severe form of autism manifests as aloofness and indifference to other 
people. Most autistic children show attachment on a simple physical level to adults they 
know well but are indifferent to children of their own age. In a less severe form, the child 
passively accepts social contact, even showing some pleasure in this, although they make
3
no spontaneous approaches. Some autistic children approach other people spontaneously 
but do so in an odd, inappropriate way and pay little or no attention to the responses of 
the people they approach. Among the most able adolescents and adults, the social 
impairment sometimes evolves into an inappropriately stilted and formal manner of 
interaction with family and friends as well as strangers.
Impairment o f social communication
Autistic children show a lack of appreciation of the pleasure of communication. 
This is true even of those who have a lot of speech, which they use to talk ‘at’ rather than 
‘with’ others. They appear to lack understanding that language is a tool for conveying 
social and emotional information to others. They show difficulty in talking about feelings 
or thoughts and in understanding the emotions, ideas and beliefs of others. They have 
poor comprehension of the information conveyed by gesture, miming, facial expression, 
bodily posture, and vocal intonation. They lack the use of gesture, miming, facial 
expressions, vocal intonation and bodily posture to convey information. Those with good 
vocabularies have a literal understanding and use of words, an idiosyncratic, sometimes 
pompous choice of words and phrases, and limited content of speech.
Impairment o f imagination
Autistic children show an inability to play imaginatively with objects or toys or 
with other children or adults. There is a tendency to select for attention minor or trivial
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aspects of things in the environment instead of an imaginative understanding of the 
meaning of the whole scene (e.g., a wheel instead of the whole toy train). Some children 
have a limited range of imaginative activities that they have copied, for example, from 
television programs. They pursue these repetitively and cannot be influenced by 
suggestions from other children. They lack understanding of the purpose of pursuits that 
involve comprehension of words and their complex associations. There is consequently a 
lack of motivation to indulge in these activities even if the necessary skills are available 
to the child.
Repetitive stereotyped activities
These can take simple or complex forms. Examples of simple stereotyped 
activities include flicking of fingers, objects, and pieces of string; spinning objects or 
watching things that spin; tapping and scratching on surfaces; inspecting, walking along 
and tracing lines and angles; feeling special textures; rocking, especially standing up and 
jumping from back foot to front foot; tapping, scratching or otherwise manipulating parts 
of the body; repetitive head banging or self injury; teeth grinding; repetitive grunting or 
screaming. Children of higher levels of ability often show complex routines. Some 
complex stereotyped activities involve objects, such as intense attachment to particular 
objects for no apparent purpose; a fascination with regular repeated patterns of objects or 
sounds; arranging objects in lines or patterns; the collection, for no apparent purpose, of 
large numbers of objects such as plastic bottles, pebbles, or the tops from tubes of sweets. 
Examples of complex stereotyped activities involving routines include insistence on
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following the identical route to certain places, insistence on a lengthy bedtime ritual, and 
repetition of a sequence of odd bodily movements. Examples of complex verbal or 
abstract repetitive activities include fascination with certain topics such as electricity, 
astronomy, birds, train timetables, or specific people, asking the same series of questions 
and demanding standard answers.
Wing and Gould (1979) argued that autism comprises a triad of impairments in 
the domains of socialisation, communication and imagination. First, the child’s social 
relationships and social development are abnormal. The autistic child shows little or no 
interest in joining group activities or playing with other children and derives no 
satisfaction from being a part of a social event. They seem to regard people as inanimate 
objects rather than living beings with feelings, needs and emotions. Consequently, they 
rarely seek comfort from an adult or return a mutual glance or smile. Second, the child 
fails to develop normal communication. Whereas some autistic children elect to be mute, 
others show echolalia (repeating words and phrases they have just heard) or are obsessed 
with talking about a single topic such as bus timetables or numerical calculations. When a 
child has a sufficient range of vocabulary, language is often used repetitively and 
inappropriately and the context of the situation is not taken into consideration. Third, the 
child’s interests and activities are restricted and repetitive rather than being flexible and 
imaginative. The autistic child is greatly lacking in imagination and is unable to indulge 
in any form of pretend play. Instead, they often favour activities that involve stacking or 
sorting, for example, spending hours at a time stacking blocks in exactly the same order,
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placing one object on top of another or ordering objects in a repetitive manner. They 
resist change and adhere rigidly to stereotyped routines.
1.2 Diagnosing autism
According to the Autistic Society, almost all children with autistic spectrum 
disorders show evidence of developmental abnormality in the first two or three years of 
life. Although some seem to develop normally in the first year or two, others show 
indications of developmental problems before their first birthday. There are numerous 
identification instruments used to diagnose autism but the two systems favoured by 
psychiatrists are the DSM-IV and the ICD-10:
The DSM-IV System
A. Qualitative impairment in reciprocal and social interaction.
• Marked lack of awareness of the existence of feelings of others.
• No or abnormal seeking of comfort at times of distress.
• No or impaired imitation.
• No or abnormal social play.
• Gross impairments in ability to make peer friendships.
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B. Qualitative impairments in verbal and non-verbal communication, and in imaginative 
activities.
• No mode of communication, such as communicative babbling, facial expression, 
gesture, mime or spoken language.
• Markedly abnormal non-verbal communication as in the use of eye-gaze, facial 
expression, body posture or gestures to initiate or modulate social interaction.
• Absence of imaginative activity, such as play acting of adult roles, fantasy characters 
or animals, lack of interest in stories about imaginary events.
• Marked abnormalities in the production of speech, including volume, pitch, stress, 
rate, rhythm and intonation.
• Marked abnormalities in the form or content of speech, including stereotyped and 
repetitive use of speech.
• Marked impairment in the ability to initiate or sustain conversation with others, 
despite adequate speech.
C. Markedly restricted repertoire of activities and interests as shown by:
• Stereotyped bodily movements such as hand flicking or twisting, spinning, head
banging, and complex whole body movements.
• Persistent preoccupation with parts of objects or attachment to unusual objects.
• Marked distress over changes in trivial aspects of environment.
• Unreasonable insistence on following routines in precise detail.
• Markedly restricted range of interests and a preoccupation with one narrow interest.
D. Specify if onset during infancy or childhood (after 36 months).
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The ICD -  10 System
A. Qualitative impairments in reciprocal social interaction.
• Failure to use eye gaze, body posture, facial expression and gesture to regulate 
interaction adequately.
• A failure to develop peer relationships that involve a mutual sharing of interests, 
activities and emotions.
• Rarely seeking and using other people for comfort and affection at times of stress or 
distress and/or offering comfort and affection to others when they are showing 
distress or unhappiness.
• A lack of shared enjoyment in terms of vicarious pleasures in other people’s 
happiness and/or a spontaneous seeking to share their own enjoyment through joint 
involvement with others.
• A lack of socio-emotional reciprocity, as shown by an impaired or deviant response to 
other people’s emotions and/or lack of modulation of behaviour according to the 
social context and/or a weak integration of socio-emotional and communicative 
behaviours.
B. Qualitative impairments in communication.
• A delay in or total lack of spoken language that is not accompanied by an attempt to 
compensate by the use of gesture or mime as alternative modes of communication.
• A relative failure to initiate or sustain conversational interchange in which there is 
reciprocal to and fro responsiveness to the communication of the other person.
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• Stereotyped and repetitive use of language and/or idiosyncratic use of words or 
phrases.
• Abnormalities in pitch, stress, rate, rhythm and intonation of speech.
• A lack of varied, spontaneous make-believe play or, when young, social imitative 
play.
C. Restricted, stereotyped patterns of behaviour, interests and activities.
• An encompassing preoccupation with stereotyped and restricted patterns of interest.
• Specific attachments to unusual objects.
• Apparently compulsive adherence to specific non-functional routines or rituals.
• Stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms that involve either hand/finger flapping
or twisting or complex whole body movements.
• Pre-occupation with parts of objects or non-functional elements of play materials.
• Distress over changes in small non-functional details of the environment.
Other identification instruments used in the description of autism include the following:
• Autism Behaviour Checklist.
• Autism Diagnostic Interview.
• Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule.
• Behaviour Observation Scale for Autism.
• Behaviour Rating Instrument for Autism and Atypical children.
• Behavioural Summarised Evaluation.
• Checklist for Autism in Toddlers.
• Childhood Autism Rating Scale.
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• Diagnostic checklist for Behaviour-Disturbed Children.
• Infant Behavioural Summarised Evaluation.
• Pre-Linguistic Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule.
1.3 The aetiology of autism
Despite extensive research, the causes of autism have yet to be determined. Most 
investigations into this topic have focused on possible genetic transmission, brain 
dysfunction (either genetically mediated or due to external causes such as birth trauma), 
physiological dysfunction, and a variety of environmental factors such as parenting, diet, 
and exposure to viruses.
Genetic factors
Genetic factors are implicated in autism given that the disorder is vastly more 
common in boys than in girls (a ratio of approximately 4:1 or 5:1). Additionally, twin 
studies have consistently found a higher incidence of autism in identical twins and 
siblings of autistic patients than in the general population (review by Piven & Folstein, 
1994). It has also been noted that the concordance rate for autism in identical twins is 
higher than in non-identical twins, as would be expected if genetic factors play a role in 
the disorder (Folstein & Rutter, 1977; Bailey, Le Couteur, Gottesman, Bolton, Simonoff, 
Yuzda, & Rutter, 1995).
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Brain dysfunction
Several types of brain scans are currently being used in autism research including 
M.R.I. (Magnetic Resonance Imaging), C.A.T. (Computed Axial Tomography), P.E.T. 
(Positron Emission Tomography), and S.P.E.T. (Single Photon Emission Tomography) 
scans. Some studies using the M.RI. scanner have found evidence of abnormalities of the 
cerebellum in children and adults with autism (Piven, 1990). Courchesne, Townsend, 
Akshoomoff, Yeung-Courchesne, Murakami, & Lincoln (1994) suggested the cerebellum 
plays a role in the control of attention and thus might determine the ability to engage in 
joint social attention. Abnormalities in the frontal lobes have also been implicated in 
autism given that patients with acquired brain damage in the region of the frontal lobes 
often show similar psychological defects to those suffering from autism, including 
difficulties in planning skills together with the presence of a rigid, persevering approach 
to problem solving (Baron-Cohen & Ring, 1994). Alternatively, some researchers point 
to impaired amygdala function, consistent with abnormalities of emotion perception and 
expression in autism (Bauman & Kemper, 1994). Waterhouse, Fein, and Modahl (1996) 
argued that the risk of autistic symptoms is heightened when amygdala dysfunction co­
occurs with hippocampal dysfunction.
Other physiological dysfunction
Various kinds of physiological dysfunction outside the brain have also been 
linked with autism. Some autistic patients appear to have abnormal levels of certain
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hormones or neurotransmitters, including serotonin (Buitelaar, Van Engeland, de Kogel, 
& de Vries, 1992, melatonin (Nir, Meir, Zilber, Knobler, Hadjez, & Lemer, 1995) 
secretin (Horvath & Tildon, 2001), and dopamine (Damasio & Maurer, 1978). Such 
research suggests possible drug treatments for autism (e.g., Cook & Leventhal, 1995).
Environmental factors
During the 1960s, many researchers believed that autism arose when parents were 
affectively cold and distant towards their child. It was even suggested that autistic 
children were victims of their socio-demographic position, having highly intellectual, 
upper social-class parents who were emotionally unavailable (Singer & Wynne, 1963; 
Bettelheim, 1967). It is much more likely that, in the early days, relatively high numbers 
of diagnoses made in this social bracket reflected referral bias rather than clinical fact 
(Aarons & Gittens, 1992). Various investigations into parental style have found no 
significant difference in warmth, responsiveness and sociability between parents of 
autistic children and parents of non-autistic children. On the contrary, many autistic 
children have normal siblings, indicating that the parents’ behaviour is not at fault 
(Cantwell, Baker & Rutter, 1978).
Research into the role of environmental factors such as diet has also proved 
controversial. It has been suggested that autistic children have problems in metabolising 
casein (cows’ milk protein) and gluten (wheat starch), but their disorder is not always 
alleviated when such foodstuffs are eliminated from their diet (Williams, 1996).
Similarly, the idea that autism is caused by viruses contracted by the mother during
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pregnancy, or subsequently by the child, has been the subject of intense debate and 
speculation. Rubella, syphilis, varicella and cytomegalovirus are all viewed as possible 
culprits (e.g., Chess, 1977; Deykin & MacMahon, 1979; Stubbs, 1978), but the findings 
to date have been equivocal.
1.4 Cognitive deficits in autism
The term ‘cognition’ encompasses the various functions by which the brain 
receives, stores and processes incoming information about the environment. Cognition 
therefore includes attention, perception, memory, learning, judgement and thinking. In 
research into autism, there has been considerable interest in the question of whether 
autistic children have fundamental cognitive deficits that underlie their various problems 
with language, social interaction and imagination. Three main hypotheses have been 
advanced, first, that autistic children lack a theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985), second, that they suffer executive dysfunction (e.g., 
Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Russell, 1997), and third, that they have abnormal 
visuo-spatial abilities (Mitchell & Ropar, 2003).
The theory o f mind hypothesis
The ‘theory of mind’ hypothesis of autism has been particularly influential. The 
term ‘theory of mind’ relates to the ability of normal children to attribute mental states 
such as beliefs, desires and intentions to themselves and others, as a way to make sense of
and predict behaviour (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978). To have a 
theory of mind (ToM) is therefore to understand that other people have their own 
interpretations of the world and to make inferences about what other people believe to be 
the case in given situations. The ToM hypothesis was partly motivated by Leslie (1987), 
who proposed that an innate cognitive mechanism was necessary for representing mental 
states. Leslie's theory of mind module (ToM) generates and uses second-order 
representations that make sense of otherwise contradictory information. For example, a 
child who sees her mother pretending that a banana is a telephone has in mind facts about 
both objects (first-order representations). The child avoids confusion because she 
computes from the concept of pretending (a second-order representation) that her mother 
is engaging simultaneously in an imaginary and real activity (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
Evidence suggests that autistic children understand representations such as 
photographs but experience difficulty with tests of the understanding of mental 
representations. This has been demonstrated in tasks inducing children to reason about 
false beliefs. For example, in the Sally-Ann Test (see Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), children 
hear a story about a doll called Sally and another doll called Ann. Sally has a basket and 
Ann has a box. Sally puts her marble in her basket and then goes away. However, while 
she is gone, Ann takes the marble out of the basket and puts it in the box. Children are 
asked where Sally will look for her marble when she comes back. Baron-Cohen et al. 
(1985) found that the vast majority (about 80%) of children with autism (mean age 12 
years) judged incorrectly that Sally would look in the box; that is, they appeared not to 
understand the nature of her false belief. In contrast, most normal children aged 4 years
and above answered correctly that Sally would look in her basket. Baron-Cohen et al. 
also observed that most children with Down’s syndrome were able to acknowledge 
Sally’s false belief, despite being slightly younger on average than the children with 
autism and having a slightly lower verbal age.
Children with autism fail not only the Sally-Ann task but also a variety of other 
tasks designed to tap the understanding of false belief. For example, in the deceptive-box 
test (Pemer, Leekham, & Wimmer, 1987; Pemer, Frith, Leslie, & Leekham, 1989), 
children are shown a Smarties tube and are asked what they think it contains. Most 
children answer “smarties” or “sweets”. The tube is then opened and children are shown 
that the tube in fact contains a pencil. The tube is closed again and children are asked 
what another child would probably think the Smarties tube contains. Pemer et al. (1987) 
found that most normal 3-year-olds incorrectly answered “a pencil” whereas most normal 
5-year-olds correctly answered “smarties”. In contrast, Pemer et al. (1989) found that 
most autistic children claimed that another person would predict there to be a pencil 
inside the tube. They further demonstrated that when children were asked to recall what 
they had predicted to be in the box in the first place, autistic participants (just like normal 
3-year-olds; Gopnik & Astington, 1988) were usually unable to acknowledge their own 
false belief. That is, they reported what they knew to be inside the tube rather than what 
they had previously believed to be the case.
Autistic participants' failure on false-belief tasks has since been replicated in a 
number of procedures, for example, using real people instead of toys and using a control
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group of specifically language-impaired children to rule out a language deficit 
explanation (Leslie and Frith, 1988; Pemer, Frith, Leslie and Leekham, 1989). 
Nevertheless, other studies have obtained results that pose difficulties for the theory of 
mind hypothesis. First, several investigations have shown that some children diagnosed 
as autistic do pass tests of false belief understanding, with the success rate ranging 
between 20% and 60%. Indeed, a minority of autistic children also pass tests of second- 
order belief attribution in which they are required to understand that people hold beliefs 
not just about reality but also about other people’s beliefs (Bowler, 1992). Second, it has 
been observed that some disabled but non-autistic groups such as deaf children similarly 
show poor performance on theory of mind tasks (Peterson & Siegal, 1995). Third, the 
theory of mind account fails to explain such non-triad features of autism as a restricted 
repertoire of interests, a preoccupation with the parts of objects, and a lack of pretend 
play (Jarrold, Butler, Cottington, & Jimenez, 2000).
The executive dysfunction hypothesis
In contrast, the executive dysfunction hypothesis links autism with a disorder in 
higher cognitive functions such as attention, thinking and reasoning. Standard executive 
function measures of set shifting, inhibition and planning include the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test and the Tower of Hanoi test. Ozonoff et al. (1991) presented autistic people 
with the Tower of Hanoi and Wisconsin Card Sort tests and examined their performance 
on tests of both simple and second-order false beliefs. They found that although some 
autistic children failed to show a theory of mind deficit, all of them were impaired on
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tests of executive function. They therefore proposed that executive dysfunction rather 
than a lack of theory of mind underlies many of the social and non-social impairments of 
autism. Consistent with this view, Russell (1997) suggested impairments in executive 
function reflect frontal lobe dysfunction, thus explaining the repetitive, stereotyped 
behaviours found in autism.
Similar to the theory of mind hypothesis, however, attempts to explain autistic 
behaviours in terms of executive dysfunction are not without their difficulties. First, like 
theory of mind deficits, executive dysfunction is not unique to autism and is found in 
other clinical groups such as those with obsessive-compulsive disorder (Bishop, 1993). 
Second, people who have executive impairments caused by damage to the frontal-lobe 
region of the brain do not necessarily show autistic behaviours (Mitchell, 1997). The 
picture is further complicated by recent evidence indicating a link between theory of 
mind and executive function in both typical and autistic development (Frye, Zelazo, & 
Burack, 1998). Pemer & Lang (1999) concluded that executive function and theory of 
mind are functionally interdependent such that an understanding of mental states is 
required for executive control and the exercise of executive function is one of the main 
bases for increasing the understanding of minds. Carlson & Moses (2001) have similarly 
argued that executive function, particularly inhibitory control, affects both the emergence 
and expression of mental state knowledge during early childhood.
18
Abnormalities in visuo-spatial abilities
Finally, a variety of claims have been made that autism is characterized by 
peculiarities of visuo-spatial skills. Research in this domain has examined the ability of 
individuals with autism to perform perceptual integration, to draw on pre-existing 
semantic knowledge when dealing with visual input, to switch effectively between 
different levels of hierachical stimuli, and to achieve deep rather than shallow processing 
(review by Mitchell & Ropar, 2003).
1. A weak drive for central coherence
One important observation in relation to autism has been that sufferers typically 
perform well on the Block Design and Object Assembly sub-tests of the Weschler 
Intelligence Scale (Weschler, 1981), despite otherwise showing mental retardation (e.g., 
Shah & Frith, 1993). Such findings have led to the suggestion that autism is characterized 
by weak ‘central coherence.’ According to Frith (1989), ‘central coherence’ reflects a 
person’s ability to perceive an integrated whole from a set of parts. In the Block Design 
test, participants are shown complex patterns that they are asked to reconstruct using a set 
of patterned blocks. As the designs are noted for their strong gestalt qualities, most 
people have difficulty analysing them into their constituent parts. The finding that autistic 
children and adults demonstrate superiority over normal controls on the Block Design test 
can therefore be attributed to weak central coherence.
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Shah and Frith (1993) further observed that non-autistic people performed better 
on the Block Design test when the blocks were initially spaced slightly apart than when 
they were pushed together. In contrast, many autistic participants performed just as well 
when the blocks were initially together as when they were initially apart, suggesting that 
they were not as distracted by the global configuration. In another experiment, Shah and 
Frith (1983) compared the performance of autistic participants and matched controls on 
the Embedded Figures Test (EFT). This test requires participants to spot a hidden figure 
(triangle or house shape) among a larger meaningful drawing (such as a clock). It was 
hypothesised that, due to their propensity to see parts rather than wholes, people with 
autism would spot the hidden figures more easily, and this prediction was supported.
As pointed out by Brian and Bryson (1996), however, the superior achievements 
of autistic individuals on the Embedded Figures Test can be explained in two ways. One 
possibility is that such individuals find it difficult to extract meaning from visual input, 
making it less likely that they will pay attention to the whole picture. Alternatively, 
autism might be characterized by a heightened facility to perceive parts irrespective of 
global meaning. According to the latter idea, central coherence deficits would better be 
described as deficits in perceptual integration. To disentangle these possibilities, recent 
research into the visuo-spatial capabilities of individuals with autism has aimed to 
evaluate independently their skills of perceptual integration and their ability to draw on 
prior semantic knowledge.
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One approach to assessing perceptual integration in individuals with autism has 
been to gauge their responses to visual illusions. If the facility for perceptual integration 
is weak in autism then such individuals should not be susceptible to visual illusions 
(Mitchell & Ropar, 2003). In the pioneering study of this type, Happe (1996) reported 
that autistic children outperformed a non-autistic control group at making accurate 
judgements about such typical illusions as the Titchener circles. However, subsequent 
research by Ropar and Mitchell (1999) cast doubt on Happe’s findings. Ropar and 
Mitchell demonstrated that autistic participants performed similarly to non-autistic 
participants when asked to make a manual adjustment of the size of one of the inner 
Titchener circles so that it matched the other. They suggested that Happe’s failure to 
observe sensitivity to illusions in her autistic group could be attributed to her use of a 
verbal rather than behavioural measure, specifically, such that participants were scored 
for their ability to respond “same” without there being a control condition in which they 
would have been scored correct for answering “different”. Ropar and Mitchell (1999) 
further demonstrated that if the appropriate control condition was included then autistic 
patients succumbed to visual illusions as readily as a non-autistic group even when tested 
verbally.
Ropar and Mitchell (2002) similarly failed to find evidence of weakened 
perceptual integration in autism. In their study, participants were asked to reproduce the 
image of a circle presented on a slant such that it appeared as an ellipse. In one condition, 
the circle was presented within a visual context providing abundant cues that it was really 
a circle. In another condition, such cues were eliminated although participants knew from
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prior exposure what the object was. It was found that if the strong visual cues were 
included then the autistic group exaggerated circularity to the same extent as the non- 
autistic group when reproducing the shape. They therefore appeared to have integrated 
the object with its visual context. Ropar and Mitchell concluded that the results of their 
study contradicted Happe’s (1999) suggestion that people with autism have impaired 
perceptual integration at the level of discrete objects.
Another method of examining perceptual integration in autism has been to test 
sufferers for global-to-local interference in their processing of hierarchical stimuli. 
Abundant evidence indicates that such interference is commonplace among non-autistic 
people. For example, Navon (1977) showed that if participants were presented with a 
large letter composed of smaller letters then they were faster to identify the smaller letters 
when they were congruent with the large letter (e.g., small Ss within a large S) than when
f
they were incongruent (e.g., small Ss within a large H). Mottron and Belleville (1993) 
found that an autistic savant E.C. experienced global interference on the hierarchical 
letter task to the same extent as a non-autistic comparison group, indicating he integrated 
the different levels of the stimulus. This basic finding has been replicated in non-savant 
autistic patients using similar procedures (e.g., Plaisted, Swettenham, & Rees, 1999) and, 
again, such evidence contradicts the idea that autism is characterized by deficient powers 
of perceptual integration.
As far as the ability of autistic individuals to extract meaning from visual input is 
concerned, research has produced conflicting findings. Mottron, Belleville, & Menard
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(1999) examined the reactions of autistic versus non-autistic participants to impossible 
figures (e.g., the devil’s fork and the Penrose triangle) and found that only the non- 
autistic group appreciated their oddity. The fact that the autistic group were oblivious to 
the impossibility of the figures could mean that they failed to connect them with relevant 
prior knowledge. This could indicate an impairment of semantic representations in autism 
or, alternatively, an impairment of access to such representations. On the other hand, 
Mitchell and Ropar (2003) pointed out that autistic patients might overlook the oddity of 
impossible figures simply because they focus their attention on lower-level detail and not 
because they are less likely to draw on their pre-existing knowledge when confronted 
with such figures.
To assess directly the effects of knowledge on autistic perception, Ropar and 
Mitchell (2002) considered the outcomes for their slanted circle experiment in the 
condition for which no visual cues were present but for which participants knew in 
advance that they would be seeing a circle. In this condition, unlike that where contextual 
cues were provided, the autistic group showed significantly less exaggeration of 
circularity than the non-autistic group when attempting to reproduce the figure. Thus, the 
autistic group showed an attenuated effect of prior knowledge.
In contrast, Ropar and Mitchell (2001) found no evidence that autistic children 
were less likely than non-autistic children to rely on prior knowledge while performing 
an object/colour matching procedure. Participants were confronted with a series of 
coloured pictures of objects that each had two colours presented alongside and were
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asked to select on each trial the colour that better matched the target object. Some objects 
had a category-associated colour (e.g., a banana, a tomato) and others did not (e.g., a 
balloon, a car). In the pictures shown to the children, however, the objects with category- 
associated colours were depicted in an incongruous colour (e.g., a blue banana). The 
interest on such trials was in seeing whether children chose the colour that represented 
the semantic match to the target (i.e., yellow) or the surface match (i.e., blue). It was 
found that the autistic children behaved similarly to the non-autistic children in this 
paradigm, tending to select the semantic match when presented with an object that had a 
category-associated colour and tending to select the surface match when presented with 
an object that had no associated colour. The results therefore suggested that there is no 
major impairment in autism in the ability to recruit prior knowledge when processing 
visual input.
2. Alternative proposals ‘
f
Given the challenges to the central coherence hypothesis presented by evidence of 
perceptual integration and sensitivity to prior knowledge in autistic patients, researchers 
have sought to explain their aberrant visuo-spatial processing in other ways. Recent 
proposals have been informed by new findings regarding abnormal visuo-spatial skills in 
autism.
First, autism appears to be characterized by superior performance in visual search 
paradigms (e.g., searching for an tilted letter in a background of vertical letters). Such
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superiority is apparent both when targets are defined by a single, unique feature and when 
they are defined by a unique conjunction of features (e.g., searching for a red X in a 
background of red T and green X distracters; Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen,
1998a; O’Riordan, Plaisted, Driver, & Baron-Cohen, 2001). It has also been noted that, 
relative to non-autistic groups, autistic adults and children are less impaired in their 
search speed and accuracy by increasing similarity between targets and distracters 
(O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001). These findings hold up even when the autistic and non- 
autistic groups are matched for non-verbal ability (O’Riordan et al., 2001).
The fact that autistic individuals show superior performance in search tasks 
involving conjunctive targets further contradicts the central coherence hypothesis because 
the ability to detect targets defined by conjunctions of features requires perceptual 
integration (O’Riordan et al., 2001). To explain this finding, one suggestion has been that 
individuals with autism show enhanced discrimination, that is, reduced perception of 
similarity and augmented perception of difference (O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001). This 
idea accords with evidence that autism is associated with heightened skills of 
discrimination between similar novel stimuli (Plaisted, O’Riordan, & Baron-Cohen, 
1998b), and it can account for good performance in the Embedded Figures Test and the 
Block Design Test (O’Riordan & Plaisted, 2001). Other suggestions have been, first, that 
autism might reflect a deficit of endogenous attention-shifting mechanisms (Swettenham, 
Milne, Plaisted, Campbell, & Coleman, 2001), and second, that autistic individuals show 
stronger inhibitory and/or excitatory processing (O’Riordan et al., 2001).
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Another important finding in autism research is that, in addition to showing 
global-to-local interference when confronted with hierarchical stimuli, individuals with 
autism suffer local-to-global interference too (Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Plaisted, 
Swettenham, & Rees, 1999; Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton, & Tonge, 2002). 
Importantly, local-to-global interference is not observed among people who are not 
autistic (Mottron & Belleville, 1993; Plaisted et al., 1999). Results for autistic groups 
appear to reflect a genuine difficulty in dealing with hierarchical levels given that autistic 
patients have no problems apprehending two different interpretations of a stimulus, as 
demonstrated by their unimpaired performance when tested with ambiguous figures such 
as the duck/rabbit (Ropar, Mitchell, & Ackroyd, 2003).
Whereas it has been suggested that local-to-global interference in autism might 
reflect a broader problem of executive function and, thus, inhibition (Rinehart et al., 
2002), this suggestion fails to account for aspects of visuo-spatial processing that are 
superior in autism (Mitchell & Ropar, 2003). A different proposal is that, through a 
process o f ‘paradoxical functional facilitation’, difficulties in processing input on a deep 
level provoke autistic patients to develop superior skills in processing on a low level 
(Mottron & Burack, 2001; Mottron, Morasse, & Belleville, 2001). This perspective does 
not assume an inherent aptitude for low-level processing in autism but, instead, implies 
that such an aptitude emerges with development in compensation for deficits in high- 
level processing. The idea of paradoxical functional facilitation allows for preserved 
configural processing in autism, in conflict with the central coherence hypothesis, but 
predicts deficits in some aspects of processing for meaning (Mitchell & Ropar, 2003).
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Cognitive deficits in autism: Summary and conclusions
In summary, despite the impressive body of evidence in relation to autism, the 
nature of the fundamental cognitive deficit remains unclear. Whereas the ToM account 
explains why autistic children have difficulty with joint attention, false beliefs and 
deception, it fails to explain preserved and superior skills in non-social areas. The 
executive dysfunction hypothesis similarly explains why autistic children fail on false- 
belief tasks but fails to account for islets of ability. Finally, research into visuo-spatial 
skills is consistent with the uneven pattern of intellectual disabilities observed in autism 
but more research is needed to explore its potential for explaining the autistic child’s 
language and social impairments.
Recently, some investigators have suggested ways in which abnormalities in 
visuo-spatial skills in autism might explain the triad features of autism. For example, 
despite early claims that theory of mind deficits and weak central coherence are unrelated 
aspects of the autistic syndrome (Frith & Happe, 1994), subsequent research has 
indicated that central coherence is linked with theory of mind capabilities. Baron-Cohen 
& Hammer (1997) found that weak central coherence was predictive of poor performance 
on complex theory of mind tasks such as reading intentions from pictures of people’s 
eyes. Similarly, Jarrold et al. (2000) showed that performance on theory of mind tests 
was inversely related to speed on the Embedded Figures Test in the general population. 
The Jarrold et al. study additionally found that the relation between weak central 
coherence and theory of mind deficits held up for typically developing children and for
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children with autism when verbal mental age was accounted for. Following Frith (1989), 
they suggested that successful performance on theory of mind tests requires a 
“meaningful” integration of information. For example, in everyday social interactions 
there is typically a need to co-ordinate attention between self, other, and the object of the 
other’s attention (Hobson, 1993).
Proponents of the idea of enhanced perceptual discrimination have similarly 
argued that low-level abnormalities of visuo-spatial processing might account for high- 
level deficits in social cognition. For example, it has been suggested that enhanced 
discrimination is likely to cause diminished levels of generalization (O’Riordan & 
Plaisted, 2001; Plaisted, 2001). Given that the ability to generalize is fundamental to 
inferential thought, analogical reasoning, and categorization, it would not be surprising if 
enhanced discrimination produced autistic symptoms.
2. CHILDREN’S DRAWING DEVELOPMENT
2.1 Drawing development in non-autistic children
Representational drawing usually begins at about the age of 20 months and is 
indicated when children name their scribbles either before or after they have produced 
them. Nevertheless, children’s productions at this stage tend to bear little or no 
resemblance to the real object. Human figure drawings tend to appear at about the age of 
3 years and, once again, are hugely distorted relative to reality. Often, the shape of a head 
is set directly upon two legs and arms may or may not be present. Such forms are 
commonly known as tadpole figures. Despite the fact that children this age tend to know 
most features of the human body, tadpole drawers often have problems copying an 
adult’s conventional drawing of a human figure. Realistically proportioned figures are 
generally not produced until the age of about 8 years, and drawings of the human figure 
continue to improve up to the age of about 12 years during which time children introduce 
a progressively greater number of fine details (Cox, 1992).
The shift from intellectual to visual realism
Young children also make errors when drawing simple objects and scenes. For 
example, they might represent the model from the wrong perspective or provide a 
mixture of viewpoints, and they often depict hidden features. A major contributor to the 
understanding of children’s drawing development was Luquet (1913, 1927) who
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described the three main stages of development. First is the pre-schematic stage, or the 
stage of ‘synthetic incapacity’, taking place between two-and-a-half and five years of age. 
The pre-schematic stage represents children’s earliest attempts to draw forms that depict 
some object of their experience although they generally fail in positioning, co-ordination 
and synthesis of elements. Second is the stage o f ‘intellectual realism.’ Luquet argued 
that at this stage children’s drawing reflect their underlying concepts. Hence, even when 
given instructions to draw a particular object from their current viewpoint, children tend 
to draw what they know rather than what they can see. Luquet introduced the notion of 
the ‘internal model’ which he described as representing children’s understanding of the 
criterial properties of an object or whichever properties they believe to be most central or 
important. Whereas Luquet assumed that a child does not necessarily incorporate all then- 
conceptual knowledge into the internal model, he argued that the internal model governs 
children’s drawing during the stage of intellectual realism. Luquet suggested that children 
rely less on conceptual knowledge in producing drawings with age. Thus they eventually 
attain the third and final stage of drawing development, that o f ‘visual realism’. This 
stage, characterized by relatively true-to-life representations of visual scenes from one 
fixed viewpoint, is usually reached after the age of ten years.
Although recent research has suggested that the developmental progression from 
intellectual to visual realism occurs at an earlier age than Luquet thought (namely, at 
around 7 years), his basic findings have been replicated in many studies. For example, 
Freeman and Janikoun (1972) presented children with a mug that had a picture of a 
flower painted on the outside surface. Children were allowed to inspect the mug and to
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identify it as a mug before the drawing task commenced. The mug was then positioned on 
a table so that children could not see the handle although they could see the picture of the 
flower. The children were instructed to draw the mug exactly as it looked to them from 
where they were sitting. Freeman and Janikoun found that the children aged 7 years and 
above usually produced accurate drawings, that is, they omitted the handle and included 
the flower. By contrast, the younger children tended to include the handle and omit the 
flower, thus showing intellectual realism. Freeman and Janikoun agreed with Luquet in 
suggesting that young children draw from their internal model of an object rather than 
from reality. Hence, they portray typical or generic features (i.e., the handle) but not 
idiosyncratic features (i.e., the flower).
Nevertheless, Luquet’s model of drawing development has been criticised due to 
findings that children as young as four years produce view-specific drawings in some 
circumstances. For example, Cox (1981) showed that 6-year-olds who were unable to 
partially occlude a ball placed behind a toy wall were nevertheless able to produce a 
realistic drawing of a toy policeman ‘hiding’ behind the wall. Similarly, Littleton & Cox 
(1989) induced 7-year-old children to depict partial occlusion when balls were given 
faces and when one character ‘hid’ behind another. Both Cox (1991) and Light and Foot 
(1985) demonstrated that any scene in which the two objects are dissimilar encourages 
visually realistic drawings. For example, a ball behind a wall usually elicits partial 
occlusions, but not a ball behind a ball, or a wall behind a wall.
When young children are asked to draw a mug or cup with its handle hidden from 
view, the incidence of commission errors can be reduced if the importance of orientation
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is emphasised either by contextual manipulations or explicit instructions. Using the 
former approach, Davis (1983, 1985) evaluated drawing accuracy among 4- to 5-year- 
olds who were shown either one or two cups. When presented with a single cup, most 
children incorrectly included the handle in their drawings. When they were presented 
with two cups, one with an occluded handle and one with a visible handle, they tended to 
portray the handle only on the cup for which it could actually be seen. Davis concluded 
that children relied on the presence of the cup with a visible handle in their drawing to 
indicate the identity of the second object. Using the second approach, Lewis, Russell & 
Berridge (1993) showed that 5-year-olds were more likely to avoid a commission error 
when they received strongly worded instructions that the exact appearance of the model 
was required than when they were mildly requested to draw realistically.
Barrett & Light (1976) suggested that Luquet’s theory regarding the progression 
from intellectual to visual realism by young children should be modified to include three 
distinct stages of drawing ability. The first stage, termed ‘symbolism’, occurs when 
children draw what they believe to be the important features of the particular concept 
represented by the model. The second stage, ‘intellectual realism’, occurs when children 
draw what they believe to be the important features of the individual model itself. The 
third stage, ‘visual realism’, occurs when children draw the model exactly as it appears 
from their current viewpoint. It is obvious from this description that ‘symbolism’ in 
Barrett & Light’s model corresponds to ‘intellectual realism’ in Luquet’s model and that 
‘intellectual realism’ in Barrett & Light’s model represents a more advanced stage of 
drawing development not recognised by Luquet. Taylor & Bacharach (1982) found
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support for Barrett & Light’s model in two experiments. Their first study examined 
whether 5-year-old children could be induced to include non-defining information in their 
depiction of a cup with an occluded handle. It was found that about 60% of the sample 
did depict a picture of a flower on the cup (i.e., a non-defining feature) if it was located 
on the inside rather than the outside surface of the cup. Taylor and Bacharach therefore 
suggested that the participants in Freeman & Janikoun’s (1972) study omitted a flower 
positioned on the outside surface of a cup because to include it would have violated their 
drawing conventions. Specifically, they postulated that young children draw one object 
within the outline of another object only if they wish to convey the idea of containment.
In their second study, Taylor & Bacharach asked 5-year-old children to draw a cup with a 
handle that had been broken off. As for traditional tests of intellectual realism, the cup 
was positioned so that its broken handle could not be seen. Despite making commission 
errors in a drawing condition for which the occluded handle was intact, almost all the 
children drew realistically when the handle was broken. These results therefore support 
Barrett and Light’s idea that young children pass through a stage in which they are 
motivated to depict all the important features of the drawing model, both defining and 
non-defining, before they achieve true drawing realism.
Children ’s drawings and intellectual maturity
In other work, researchers have examined the extent to which children’s drawings 
are diagnostic of their wider intellectual maturity. In pioneering research, Goodenough 
(1926) devised the ‘Draw-A-Man’ test of intellectual functioning. This test uses a child’s
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elaboration of the human figure in terms of such items as number of details and body 
parts, proportion and position as an indicator of their intelligence. Harris (1964) revised 
and updated this work to produce the ‘Draw-A-Person’ test, producing separate tables of 
gender-specific norms to accommodate persistent findings of superior performance in 
girls relative to boys. Consistent with the idea that drawing skills are related to cognitive 
development, some studies have found significant, positive correlations between 
children’s achievements on the Draw-A-Person test and their I.Q. scores (e.g., Abel, Von 
Briesen, & Watz, 1996). Nevertheless, the Draw-A-Person test is widely regarded as an 
index of actual rather than potential cognitive functioning (Cox, 1993).
2.1 Drawing development in autistic children
Given the profound social and cognitive deficits that characterize autism, an 
obvious question to have been raised in the literature is whether autistic children differ 
from non-autistic children in their drawing development. In an early investigation of this 
issue, Lark-Horowitz, Lewis and Luca (1967) found that autistic patients showed a 
preference for drawing unconventional subjects, for example, yachts, churches, windows, 
and horses. Selfe (1977, 1983) similarly observed the drawings of her autistic group to be 
dominated by unusual objects whereas a matched group of non-autistic children preferred 
to adhere to familiar subjects such as flowers, houses, and people. Selfe also noted that 
whereas normal children invariably discussed and named their drawings and sought 
parents’ comments and approval about their work, none of the autistic children in her 
sample would either name or describe their drawings. They instead seemed to draw only
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for personal pleasure and satisfaction. In Selfe’s research, parents of autistic children 
reported that their child began to draw at a later age than did normal children and that 
their first attempt at drawing tended to produce a recognisable object without the 
preliminary scribbling stage. More recently, Lewis & Boucher (1991) examined possible 
differences in drawing style between autistic children and learning-impaired, non-autistic 
children who were matched in terms of chronological and mental age. They found no 
obvious discrepancies between the drawings of the groups in terms of content. However, 
in comparison to the normal children, the autistic group showed a restricted range of 
ideas for generating drawings. Similarly, Craig, Baron-Cohen and Scott (2001) found that 
autistic children were impaired relative to controls in their ability to draw imaginatively.
Other research has examined whether autistic children show precocious 
development of drawing skills relative to non-autistic children. Interest in this topic has 
been inspired by the observation that a small minority of autistic children show drawing 
ability that is considerably advanced relative to their mental age (e.g., Sacks, 1985; Selfe, 
1977, 1983). For example, Self (1977) reported the case of Nadia who, with a 
chronological age of 6 years and a mental age of only 3 years and 3 months, drew 
pictures of horses that were visually realistic in such aspects as occlusion, size-scaling, 
and perspective. There has also been widespread public interest in Steven Wiltshire, an 
autistic boy who has published three books of his accurate and highly detailed drawings 
of buildings (Wiltshire, 1987, 1989, 1991). Selfe (1977, 1983) suggested that such 
artistically gifted children with autism proceed through the same developmental stages of
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drawing as normal children but at a faster rate. They therefore produce visually realistic 
drawings at a much earlier mental age.
Interestingly, it has been observed that autistic savants sometimes lose the ability 
to draw in a visually realistic way once language develops (Selfe, 1983). Such evidence 
has led to the suggestion that it is an inability to conceptualise in autism and hence, a lack 
of assumptions and expectations about what is to be seen in the environment, that is 
responsible for instances of outstanding artistic ability (Snyder & Thomas, 1997). 
According to this view, as autistic individuals begin to develop the symbolic schemata of 
language they develop expectations about the properties of objects that interfere with 
their ability to produce a naturalistic depiction of them.
Alternatively, the talents of gifted autistic artists have been attributed to their 
propensity to weak central coherence. Hermelin, Pring & Heavey (1994) demonstrated 
that autistic savants who were gifted at visual art performed better than controls in 
manipulating segmented visual displays. They concluded that skills in segmentation and 
analysis might be of great benefit in drawing and painting. Pring, Hermelin & Heavey 
(1995) examined whether weak central coherence was characteristic of the cognition of 
gifted autistic artists and mental age matched controls with similar superior artistic 
ability. The performance of both gifted groups was compared with the performance of 
control autistic and non-autistic groups who showed no special aptitude for drawing. 
Participants were asked to reconstruct from blocks both complex, meaningful scenes and 
abstract, non-representational patterns. At least for the latter task, the presence or absence
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of artistic talent influenced the speed at which the puzzles were completed such that the 
artistically gifted groups performed faster than the non-gifted groups. Whereas there was 
no difference in completion speed between the artistically gifted normal children and the 
autistic savants, the autistic control group were faster at solving the block designs than 
the non-autistic control group. Block design performance in the autistic groups was 
uncorrelated with either chronological or mental age, supporting the idea of islets of 
ability in autism (Shah & Frith, 1993). Pring et al. concluded that a facility for visually 
decomposing wholes into their constituent parts is likely to be an important component of 
artistic ability in regards to drawing and painting. Hence, they argued that weak central 
coherence could account for the existence of gifted artistic ability in a minority of autistic 
children.
Additionally, some researchers have appealed to the idea of weak central 
coherence to explain differences in drawing skills between normal children and autistic 
children who are not artistically gifted. First, Fein, Lucci & Waterhouse (1990) found that 
non-savant autistic children were more likely than normal children to show geometric 
design overlap, human figure overlap, and human figure fragmentation in their drawings. 
Second, in a study that examined copying skills in autistic versus non-autistic groups, 
Mottron, Belleville, & Menard (1999) found that autistic participants produced more 
local features at the start of the copying process and were less affected by figure 
impossibility. Both sets of results are consistent with the notion that autistic children 
experience a local bias in perceiving scenes and objects.
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Charman & Baron-Cohen (1993) argued that if superior artistic ability in a 
minority of autistic individuals is a consequence of cognitive characteristics that are 
prominent in the wider autistic population then even autistic children without gifted 
drawing ability should show precocious drawing development. To investigate this claim, 
they examined the link between mental age and the transition from intellectual to visual 
realism in autistic children who showed no exceptional drawing ability as well as in 
normally developing children and mentally handicapped but non-autistic children. 
Participants were assessed for verbal ability using the British Picture Vocabulary Scale 
(BPVS) and non-verbal ability using Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices (RCPM). 
They were later asked to make a series of drawings, namely, a mug with its handle 
occluded, a cube, and a ball versus a doll partly occluded behind a wall. In contrast to 
predictions, results were similar for the three groups. The participants with autism who 
predominantly showed visual realism (i.e., producing no more than a single intellectually 
real drawing) were not reliably older than participants with autism who did not but all 
had a non-verbal mental age of 66 months or above. This developmental shift mirrored 
the results for the normal group, in which all participants who predominately showed 
visual realism had a non-verbal mental age of 74 months or above, and the Down’s 
syndrome group, in which no child was classified as showing predominant visual realism 
and in which no child attained a non-verbal mental age in excess of 66 months. Charman 
& Baron-Cohen concluded that for autistic children who are not artistically gifted, as for 
non-autistic children, the progression from intellectual to visual realism is predicted by 
mental age, especially non-verbal mental age.
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Charman and Baron-Cohen argued that demonstrations of intellectual realism in 
autistic children are consistent with the meta-representation theory of autism. According 
to Leslie (1987), autistic individuals are selectively impaired in their ability to construct 
mental representations of mental representations. Because intellectual realism is drawing 
what is known rather than only what can be seen, its existence in autistic children 
indicates that they are capable of mentally representing other kinds of information. 
Indeed, when Charman and Baron-Cohen compared the results for the ball-and-wall task 
with those for the doll-and-wall task they found support for the idea that autistic children 
have difficulty representing mental states. Following Cox (1981), this comparison 
evaluated participants’ ability to depict one object occluding another either with or 
without a social context by asking children in one task to depict a ball partially occluded 
by a wall and in a second task to portray a doll ‘hiding’ behind the wall (see also, Cox, 
1985; Light & McEwan, 1987; Littleton & Cox, 1989). Charman & Baron-Cohen 
predicted that because of their impairments in developing a theory of mind, reference to 
an implicitly mental activity such as hiding would not affect drawing skill in children 
with autism. This prediction was supported. For the normal group and those with mental 
handicap, introducing a social context to the visual display increased the proportion of 
children who produced visually real drawings. However, the same manipulation failed to 
increase the number of visually realistic drawings produced by the children with autism.
Eames and Cox (1994) attempted a similar investigation to Charman & Baron- 
Cohen (1993) although they matched their autistic and non-autistic groups more closely 
in terms of non-verbal mental age. They also examined the drawing performance of a
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group of non-autistic children with Down’s syndrome. Drawing ability in all groups was 
measured in terms of commission errors for defining features, attention to detail, 
depiction of spatial relationships between objects, and use of depth cues such as total and 
partial occlusion and converging perspective lines. The study found no evidence that 
drawing skills in the autistic group were more advanced than those in the non-autistic 
groups. Indeed, for many tests results were inferior in the clinical groups relative to the 
developmentally normal children. For example, when shown two balls with one partially 
occluded behind the other, both clinical groups were more likely than the normal children 
to portray the balls separately. Eames & Cox therefore concluded that exceptional artistic 
ability in some autistic individuals is likely to be a consequence of special aptitudes that 
are not common to the majority of autism sufferers.
Although not concerned with children’s ability to draw objects directly from 
perception, the study by Lewis and Boucher (1991) also shed some light on drawing 
skills in autism. In this investigation, children were asked to draw objects and scenes of 
their own choosing from imagination and their productions were assessed for realism in 
terms of proportionality, diminishing size with distance, occlusion, and representation of 
three dimensions. Consistent with the results obtained by Charman and Baron-Cohen
(1993) and Eames and Cox (1994), the drawings of the autistic sample were shown to be 
equivalent to those of the non-autistic developmentally delayed sample in their realism, 
complexity and level of detail. Lewis and Boucher additionally asked participants to draw 
a person from imagination and evaluated their performance using the scoring criteria for 
the Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Person test (Harris, 1964). There was no difference in
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the outcomes for autistic and learning-impaired non-autistic children, with scores being 
consistent with mental age in both groups. Similarly, Watanabe, Naganuma, Setoya, 
Osada, Tachimori, Kubota, and Kurita (2002) observed that children with pervasive 
developmental disorder accompanied by autistic tendencies performed at lower than age- 
expected levels on the Draw-A-Man test, although their scores were significantly higher 
than on a standard test of cognitive ability (the Tanaka-Binet test).
In summary, investigations of drawing development have uncovered few 
differences between autistic children, at least those who are not artistically gifted, and 
non-autistic children. Despite some evidence that autistic children are less imaginative 
and conventional in their choice of drawing topics than non-autistic children (Craig et al., 
2001; Lark-Horowitz et al., 1967; Lewis & Boucher, 1991; Selfe, 1977, 1983), they show 
equivalent drawing skills. Thus, just as for normally developing children, autistic children 
make commission errors for occluded features and they fail to make the transition from 
intellectual to visual realism before a mental age of approximately 6 years (Charman & 
Baron-Cohen, 1993; Eames & Cox, 1994). Nevertheless, drawing ability in autism 
appears to deviate from normal when the drawing tasks expose central coherence and 
theory-of-mind deficits. Autistic children are more likely to show a local as opposed to 
global bias when copying pictures of objects and scenes (Fein et al., 1990; Mottron et al., 
1999) and their success at portraying occlusion is unaffected by manipulations of the 
social context (Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1993).
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3. THE PRESENT STUDY
To date, the studies by Charman and Baron-Cohen (1993) and Eames and Cox
(1994) represent the only published research to have compared drawing skills in autistic 
and non-autistic children using real objects as drawing models. The present investigation 
followed the lead of these studies by asking autistic and non-autistic children to draw a 
series of visible objects, all positioned such that a single, important feature was hidden 
from their view. Importantly, however, it extended previous research in several ways. 
First, participants were shown drawing models with both generic and non-generic 
attributes, permitting a more stringent test of the transition from intellectual to visual 
realism. Second, cognitive indices of drawing realism were evaluated using a wider range 
of intellectual measures than in the past. Third, new drawing tasks were developed to 
examine the effects of functional context on children’s susceptibility to commission 
errors for a mug or cup with an occluded handle. Fourth, all participants were given a 
pre-test that assessed their understanding of view-specificity in pictures. Finally, results 
for the object-drawing tests were compared with those of the Draw-A-Person test (Harris, 
1964). Here, participants were evaluated for their drawing maturity when asked to 
produce a self-portrait from memory.
Following Eames and Cox (1994), the results for a group of autistic children were 
compared with those for two groups of non-autistic children, namely, developmentally 
normal children and Down’s syndrome children. The Down’s syndrome group was 
included to see whether any possible differences between the drawings of autistic and
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normal children are a specific effect of autism or a more general effect of mental 
retardation.
1. Assessing the shift from intellectual to visual realism
The studies by Charman and Cohen (1993) and Eames and Cox (1994) compared 
the ability of autistic and non-autistic children to achieve a realistic depiction of a mug 
with an occluded handle. As pointed out by Freeman and Janikoun (1972), however, a 
stronger test of children’s ability to attain visual realism involves checking not only 
whether they avoid commission errors for occluded generic features but also whether 
they choose to portray visible attributes of the drawing model that are idiosyncratic rather 
than generic. They reasoned that children who have reached the stage of visual realism 
should attempt to depict all the view-specific features of the model even if they are 
merely decorative. For example, Taylor and Bacharach (1982) found that 5-year-olds 
readily depicted a flower decal placed on the inside surface of a mug. Given that no such 
tests have yet been carried out with autistic children, it might be premature to conclude 
that they show similar drawing development to non-autistic children. Despite the fact that 
autistic children fail to differ from non-autistic controls in the typical age at which they 
learn to avoid commission errors for hidden generic attributes, they might nevertheless 
show precocious portrayal of visible non-generic details.
To examine this possibility, the present investigation used drawing models that 
assessed children’s ability both to omit an occluded generic feature and to include a
visible, decorative (i.e., non-generic) feature. The first model was a striped mug with its 
handle occluded. The second model was a plain coloured teapot, again with its handle 
occluded, and decorative information took the form of a single bold pattern (namely, a 
green triangle) placed just above the spout. For the mug task, stripes were chosen as the 
decorative feature to avoid challenging any drawing conventions children might have 
regarding the portrayal of containment. Taylor & Bacharach (1982) reported that 5-year- 
old children were reluctant to depict a picture of a flower on the outside of a mug because 
they feared this might be interpreted as a flower inside the mug. They therefore portrayed 
the flower only when it was located on the mug’s inner surface. In the present case, it 
seems unlikely that a drawing of a mug with stripes could falsely be perceived as a 
drawing of a mug with something inside it. Hence, there would seem to be no 
impediment to children displaying visual realism if they have attained this stage of 
drawing development. Whereas children’s conventions for depicting containment might 
potentially damage their chances of achieving visual realism in the teapot task, it was 
attempted to circumvent such difficulties by emphasizing the importance of the pattern as 
an identifying feature. Accordingly, immediately before the drawing task the 
experimenter showed children two teapots which were identical except for the fact that 
one teapot had a green triangle above its spout and the other had a green circle above its 
spout. The experimenter explained to the children that one teapot belonged to her 
(namely, the one with the triangle) and that the other belonged to her friend (namely, the 
one with the circle) and that the pattern above the spout was the only way of telling the 
teapots apart.
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2. Cognitive indices o f drawing development
Following Charman and Baron-Cohen (1993), participants in all groups were 
tested for both verbal and non-verbal mental age. Verbal mental age was assessed using 
the British Picture Vocabulary Scale (i.e., BPVS; Dunn, Dunn, Whetton & Pintillie, 
1982) and non-verbal mental age was assessed using Raven’s Coloured Progressive 
Matrices (i.e., RCPM; Raven, 1956). In addition, two other measures of intellectual 
maturity were obtained.
First, participants in both clinical groups were tested for central coherence using 
the Block Design subtest of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (WISC). Given 
evidence that weak central coherence is associated with superior drawing ability in 
autistic adults (Pring et al., 1995), it is of interest to see whether Block Design scores are 
predictive of the shift from intellectual to visual realism in autistic children.
Second, participants in all groups were assessed for theory-of-mind development 
using the Sally-Ann test. Gopnik, Slaughter, and MeltzofF (1994) suggested that an 
understanding of visual perception might be an important precursor of the understanding 
of belief. They speculated that, like beliefs, perceptions are representational states that 
can sometimes be inaccurate or false. Evidence suggests that young children only 
gradually acquire the understanding that an object can be visible to them but invisible to 
others and vice versa, with this ability not in place before the age of about 2 Vi years. At 
about the age of 3 years, they acquire the understanding of perceptual misrepresentation
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in tasks where they are asked about the appearance of an object behind a coloured screen 
(Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981). Importantly, Gopnik et al. (1994) reviewed 
evidence that success on such higher-level perspective-taking tasks appears at a slightly 
younger age than success on false belief tasks, raising the possibility that children might 
use perceptual misrepresentation as a model for false belief. They found that giving 
children experience with perceptual misrepresentation appeared to accelerate conceptual 
change as gauged by the fact that those children who received such training subsequently 
performed better on false belief tasks than a matched control group. The notion that 
children generalize their understanding of misrepresentation from perceptual contexts to 
concepts about false belief suggests that, in the present study, success on the Sally-Ann 
test might be largely confined to those participants who reliably avoid commission errors 
for the occluded handles.
3. The effects o f functional context on children’s drawing accuracy
Baron-Cohen & Charman (1993) found that autistic children’s ability to depict 
one object partially occluding another was unaffected by manipulations of the social 
context. That is, in contrast to the results for a non-autistic group, introducing the notion 
of ‘hiding’ to explain why one object was placed behind the other failed to produce an 
increase in the incidence of visually realistic drawings by the autistic sample. To date, 
however, there has been little investigation of how autistic children’s drawing accuracy 
might be affected by manipulations of the physical context. In research with non-autistic 
children, Davis (1983) observed that participants were less likely to depict the hidden
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handle of a mug if it was paired with another mug for which the handle could be seen. 
Because commission errors were more frequent when the cup was paired instead with a 
sugar bowl, Davis concluded that, in the first instance, children assumed the presence of 
the fully visible mug in their drawing made it clear what the second object was. Eames 
and Cox (1994) repeated the single- versus paired-cup task with autistic children and 
discovered that their performance failed to vary across the two conditions. Thus, children 
were no more likely to show visual realism in the paired cup task than in the single cup 
task. This null result is difficult to interpret, however, given that the manipulation of 
context in the Eames and Cox study was similarly ineffective for a group of Down’s 
syndrome children and developmentally normal children.
Accordingly, the present investigation examined whether autistic children differ 
from non-autistic children in their attention to contextual relations during drawing. 
Specifically, it aimed to see whether children’s ability to achieve a realistic depiction of a 
mug or cup with an occluded handle was affected by the presence of contextual features 
that conveyed information about the identity of the model. Children’s performance in the 
striped mug test was compared with their performance in two additional drawing tasks, 
one presenting an appropriate functional context (the cup-and-saucer task) and the other 
presenting a misleading functional context (the cup-and flowers task). In the first task, 
children were shown a teacup and saucer; in the second task, there was no saucer and, 
instead, flowers were placed in the cup. In both cases, children were asked to produce a 
realistic drawing from their viewing perspective. The work of Davis (1983) suggests that, 
relative to the striped mug task, children will be more likely to depict the hidden handle
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in the teacup-and flowers task and less likely to depict the hidden handle in the teacup- 
and-saucer task. This is because the presence of the flowers wrongly gives the impression 
that the object is a vase whereas the presence of the saucer signifies that it is a cup. If this 
prediction is upheld for the autistic as well as the non-autistic group then it will provide 
an important demonstration that autistic children are sensitive to at least some kinds of 
contextual relations during drawing.
As well as shedding light on possible context effects, the inclusion of the cup-and- 
saucer and cup-and-flowers tasks provided a further opportunity to assess children’s 
drawing skills by rating their accuracy at depicting both the saucer and the flowers. 
Importantly, unlike the case for the decorative details used in the mug and teapot tasks, 
accurate portrayal of the saucer and the flowers required that children refrain from 
depicting information that could not be seen, namely, the occluded section of the saucer 
and the occluded stalks of the flowers. These tasks therefore made it possible to see 
whether children who made commission errors for the hidden handle of the cup were 
similarly prone to make commission errors for other kinds of occluded details.
4. Assessing children’s understanding o f view-specificity in pictures
Another innovation of the present research was that participants in all three 
groups were given a pre-test to assess their understanding of view-specificity in pictures. 
This involved asking them to choose which of two photographs of an object (a front view 
versus a rear view) correctly represented that object as they could see it from their current
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viewing perspective. Previous studies of the shift from intellectual to visual realism did 
not check that children understood the instructions to produce a view-specific depiction. 
This is an important consideration when dealing with clinical groups that have delayed 
language development such as autistic and Down’s syndrome children. In the present 
case, only the participants who passed the pre-test went on to receive the tests of drawing 
ability and cognitive maturity. If superior drawing performance is shown to be associated 
with higher verbal mental age in the present study then this cannot be attributed to any 
failure to understand the drawing instructions on the part of those children with low 
verbal skills.
5. The Draw-A-Person Test
The final drawing test administered in the present research was the Goodenough- 
Harris Draw-A-Person test (Harris, 1964). Both Lewis and Boucher (1991) and Watanabe 
et al. (2002) found no difference in the results for autistic and learning-impaired non- 
autistic children on this measure. However, they did not compare the performance of 
autistic children with developmentally normal children. In the present case, participants 
in all groups were requested to draw a self-portrait from memory. Rather than judging the 
extent to which their picture showed a photographic resemblance to their self, interest 
centred in determining its maturity in terms of feature completeness and proportionality 
(Harris, 1964). .Results were inspected to determine whether children’s scores on the 
Draw-A-Person test were positively correlated with their scores on the various measures 
of intellectual maturity and with their scores for the object-drawing tasks.
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METHOD
Participants
Participants were selected from three groups, first, developmentally normal 
children (i.e., the control group), second, autistic children, and third, Down’s syndrome 
children. There were 27 children in the control group, 16 boys and 11 girls, ranging in 
age from 3 years 7 months to 7 years 5 months (M: 5:2, SD: 10). The children were 
recruited from three mainstream primary schools in the South Wales area with the 
majority being from middle-range SES backgrounds. There were 23 participants in the 
autistic group, 21 boys and 2 girls, ranging in age from 7 years 4 months to 16 years 6 
months (M: 11:10, SD: 33) One child was attending a mainstream school where she 
received support from a care assistant. The remaining children were recruited from a 
variety of autistic units and special schools located in the County of Carmarthenshire, the 
City and County of Swansea, and the County and Borough of Bridgend. Whereas four of 
these children had a mild form of autism, the remainder suffered at a more severe level 
and produced little or no language. There were 15 participants in the Down’s syndrome 
group, 9 boys and 6 girls, ranging in age from 8 years 6 months to 16 years 9 months (M: 
12:2, SD: 38). One member of this group similarly attended a mainstream school and 
received one-to-one support throughout the school day with a care assistant. The 
remaining children attended special schools and units for children with learning 
difficulties. These schools were located in the County of Carmarthenshire and the City 
and County of Swansea.
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Participants were recruited for this study following a discussion between the 
researcher and the head teacher of each establishment. In these interviews, the researcher 
provided a detailed description of each test to be undertaken and, in the case of the 
clinical groups, the head teacher helped to identify children who would have the best 
chance of completing the various procedures. Consent was additionally sought from the 
parent/guardian of each child in a letter before proceeding with the investigation (see 
Appendix A for a copy of the information sheet and the permission note).
Materials
The materials used in the investigation comprised a teddy bear, doll, striped mug, 
two teapots, a cup and saucer, artificial flowers, and two small plastic figurines.
Procedure
Permission to carry out the investigation was granted by the Bro Taf Ethics 
Committee and the Department of Psychology Ethics Committee at the University of 
Wales Swansea. Before any drawing tests or tests of intellectual maturity were 
administered, a pre-test was carried out to see whether participants comprehended 
instructions about view-specificity in pictorial representation. They were first given a 
teddy to examine, then the teddy was placed on a table in front of them and oriented such 
that it was facing in the other direction. Children were informed that they were going to 
see two pictures of the teddy and that they should point to the picture showing the teddy 
as it looked from where they were sitting. Two pictures were presented simultaneously,
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one showing the teddy from the front and the other showing the teddy from the back, and 
children were asked to select the appropriate picture. Next, the teddy was removed and 
replaced by a doll and the task was repeated. If a child failed to select the correct picture 
on both occasions then they were not tested further. All the children in the control group 
passed the pre-test. However, failures were recorded for two autistic children and one 
Down’s syndrome child and these children were therefore excluded from the fmal 
sample. Examples of the photographs used in the pre-test are presented in Appendix B.
For children who passed the pre-test, administration of the drawing tasks and 
cognitive tests took place over at least two sessions, with each session lasting no longer 
than about 40 minutes. Except for the fact that all the drawing tests were presented before 
the tests of cognitive ability, the order of presentation of the tasks was randomised across 
participants. The pace of the test administration was adapted to suit each child and testing 
was discontinued if they appeared to be fatigued or distracted. If children were unwilling 
or unable to do a particular task then they were not pressured to continue. It was 
explained to participants before the drawing tasks that the researcher wished to keep their 
pictures. After each task was completed, their drawing performance was praised.
Drawing tasks
1. The mug task The child was shown a striped mug and told, “This is what I drink 
my coffee from at playtime”. The researcher gave a simulated demonstration of sipping 
from the mug and then handed it to the child to examine. The mug was next placed on the
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table in front of the child and positioned so that its handle was hidden from view. The 
child was then provided with a blank sheet of paper and a pencil and asked to “draw the 
mug exactly as it looks to you from where you are sitting”.
2. The teapot task The child was shown two white teapots identical except for the fact 
that one had a green triangle above the spout and the other had a green circle above the 
spout. These patterns were pointed out to the child and it was explained that the teapot 
with the triangle belonged to the researcher and the teapot with the circle belonged to her 
friend. The child was then asked to recall which teapot belonged to which person. Next, 
the teapot with the circle was put away and the remaining one was placed on the table in 
front of the child and oriented such that its handle was hidden from view but the spout 
and shape were both visible. The child was asked by the researcher to “draw my teapot 
exactly as it looks to you from where you are sitting”.
3. The cup-and-saucer task The child was shown a plain coloured cup and saucer and 
given the opportunity to examine them. The cup was placed on the saucer and turned so 
that its handle was hidden from view. The child was asked to “draw the cup exactly as it 
looks to you from where you are sitting”.
4. The cup-and-flowers task The child was shown a cup and a small bunch of artificial 
flowers. The flowers were placed in the cup, which was then placed on the table and 
turned so that its handle was hidden from view. Again, the child was asked to “draw the 
cup exactly as it looks to you from where you are sitting”.
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5. The Draw-A-Person test For the Draw-A-Person test, the child was asked to draw a 
picture of their self. This meant that female participants drew a female person and male 
participants drew a male person, as recommended by the test authors. The results were 
assessed according to the scoring criteria of Harris (1964).
Tests o f intellectual maturity
Children’s verbal intelligence was measured using the British Picture Vocabulary 
Scale (Dunn et al., 1982) and their non-verbal intelligence was measured using Raven’s 
Coloured Progressive Matrices (Raven, 1956). Children were also tested for their 
understanding of false belief using the Sally-Ann test (e.g., Baron-Cohen et al., 1985). 
Finally, participants in both clinical groups were tested for their central coherence using 
the Block Design subtest of the WISC (Wechsler, 1991). The BPVS, RCPM and Block 
Design tests were administered according to the standard instructions, except in cases 
where some gesturing was required to encourage children to respond. The Sally Ann test 
involved the use of two plastic figurines, one of a fair-haired girl and the other of a dark- 
haired girl. The figurines were introduced as friends named Sally and Ann. After 
allowing the child to touch and examine the figurines, they were told the following story, 
“Sally has a marble and one day she places her marble into her basket. When the bell 
rings, Sally goes outside to play. Now while Sally is outside playing, Ann comes into the 
classroom. Do you know what she does? Ann takes the marble out of the basket and 
hides it in her box. Isn’t that naughty! Sally then comes in to the classroom and looks for 
her marble. Where do you think she will look for it, in the basket or in the box?”
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Chapter Three
RESULTS
The results are presented in seven sections. Sections 1 to 5 deal with the findings 
for the entire sample. Section 1 describes group means of achievements on the tests of 
intellectual maturity, namely, tests of verbal and non-verbal intelligence, the 
understanding of false belief, and central coherence. Section 2 examines the incidence of 
intellectual versus visual realism in each object-drawing task, focusing on children’s 
ability to avoid a commission error for the occluded handle and their accuracy at 
depicting decorative and contextual details. Section 3 examines cognitive indices of 
visual realism in each group; first, by determining the minimum levels of intellectual 
maturity associated with accurate performance on each drawing measure; and second, by 
examining the correlations between the various measures of intellectual maturity and 
drawing realism. Section 4 investigates whether children’s ability to avoid commission 
errors for the occluded handle of a mug or cup is affected by the presence of contextual 
features that provide clues about the model’s identity. Finally, Section 5 analyses the 
results of the Draw-A-Person test. Examples of children’s drawings are in Appendix C.
Sections 6 and 7 focus on the performance of selected sub-groups of children. 
Section 6 re-examines the incidence of visual realism on each of the drawing measures 
using a subset of children from the control and autistic groups closely matched on a 1:1 
basis, first, in terms of verbal age (BP VS scores), and second, in terms of non-verbal age 
(RCPM scpres). Section 7 looks for evidence of gender differences in drawing ability 
among participants in the control group.
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1. Group differences in intellectual maturity
The first set of analyses evaluated group differences in mean levels of intellectual 
maturity. Table 1 presents the results for chronological age in months (Age), BPVS age- 
equivalent scores (BPVS), RCPM age-equivalent scores (RCPM) and, for the autistic 
group, Block Design age-equivalent scores (BD). It was impossible to derive Block 
Design age-equivalent scores for the Down’s syndrome group because they uniformly 
achieved a lower level of performance than accommodated by the conversion tables (i.e., 
lower than an age-equivalent of 72 months).
Table 1. Group means (and standard deviations) of chronological age and intellectual 
maturity
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Control 62.6 (9.9) 57.1 (14.4) 69.2 (23.0) -
Autistic 142.0 (33.2) 68.1 (40.0) 95.3 (32.5) 91.8(20.9)
Down’s 147.9 (37.6) 51.3 (17.6) 49.4 (20.0) -
As can be seen, the control group attained outcomes on the tests of intellectual 
maturity that were in line with their chronological age. In contrast, both clinical groups 
showed substantial deficits for both verbal and spatial ability. Whereas the Down’s 
syndrome children demonstrated similar levels of age-equivalent performance across
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measures, the autistic children were more severely impaired in their BPVS scores than in 
their RCPM and Block Design scores.
One-way ANOVAs were used to compare the results for the three groups on the 
BPVS and RCPM measures. The groups failed to differ significantly in their performance 
on the BPVS, F  (2, 61) = 1.96,/? > .05. However, a significant outcome was obtained for 
the RCPM data, F  (2, 61) = 14.46,/? < .001. Tukey (hsd) comparisons found that the 
differences between all pairs of means were reliable (all p  values < .05).
Inspection of the results for the Sally Ann theory-of-mind test (ToM) indicated 
that the control group outperformed the clinical groups (Control group: 10 fail and 17 
pass; Autistic group: 14 fail and 9 pass; Down’s syndrome group: 10 fail and 5 pass). 
However, a Chi-square analysis found no reliable association between group membership 
and performance on the ToM measure (Pearson Chi-square = 4.44, df = 2, /? = . 11).
Next, analyses were carried out to determine the extent to which results for 
chronological age and the measures of intellectual ability were positively associated. 
Accordingly, Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated between 
chronological age, BPVS scores, RCPM scores and, for the clinical groups, Block Design 
scores. It was found that age was positively associated with BPVS scores in all three 
groups. However, only the clinical groups showed a significant positive correlation 
between their BPVS and RCPM scores. Tables 2 to 4 present the results for the control 
group, the autistic group, and the Down’s syndrome group respectively.
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Table 2. Relations between measures of intellectual maturity in the control group
Age BPVS RCPM
BPVS .592***
RCPM .293 .221
ToM -.093 -.013 .161
BD - - -
* p  < . 10 **p< .05 ***p< .01 (2-tail)
Table 3. Relations between measures of intellectual maturity in the autistic group
age BPVS RCPM
BPVS .618***
RCPM .290 .677***
ToM .395* .335 .166
BD -.101 .452** .658***
*p<. 10 **/?<.05 ***p< .01 (2-tail)
Table 4. Relations between measures of intellectual maturity in the Down’s syndrome group
age BPVS RCPM
BPVS .510**
RCPM .217 .566**
ToM .519** .021 .015
BD -.041 -.134 .308
*p < . 10 **/?<.05 ***p < .01 (2-tail)
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Additionally, data for each group were examined to determine whether there were 
differences in chronological and mental age between children who passed versus failed 
the Sally-Ann ToM test. Means are shown in Tables 5 to 7. A series of independent- 
samples t tests found an effect of chronological age on ToM success in both the autistic 
group (t (21) = 1.97,/? < .05 1-tail) and the Down’s syndrome group (t (13) = 2.19,/? < 
.05 1-tail), but no other significant outcomes.
Table 5. Relations between ToM and intellectual maturity in the control group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass ToM 61.9 56.8 72.0
Fail ToM 63.8 57.8 64.5
Table 6. Relations between ToM and intellectual maturity in the autistic group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass ToM 158.0 83.9 101.7 93.6
Fail ToM 131.7 57.2 90.9 90.0
Table 7. Relations between ToM and intellectual maturity in the Down’s syndrome group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass ToM 174.6 52.2 49.8
Fail ToM 134.6 50.9 49.2
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2. The incidence of intellectual versus visual realism
Results for the striped mug task, the teapot task, the cup-and-saucer task, and the 
cup-and-flowers task were inspected to determine the incidence of intellectual versus 
visual realism. Every member of the control group produced a full set of recognizable 
drawings and every member of the Down’s syndrome group produced at least some 
recognizable drawings. However, 4 of 23 participants in the autistic group failed to 
produce a recognizable depiction in any of the tasks. Of these 4 participants, 1 refused to 
draw anything other than rabbits, 1 produced only scribble, and 2 fixated on a single 
attribute of the initial drawing model (for example, portraying the stripes on the striped 
mug as a series of circles) and proceeded to reproduce this design for all subsequent 
models. Notably, these 4 participants performed poorly relative to other members of the 
autistic group on the various measures of intellectual maturity (BPVS: M — 39 months, 
RCPM: M  = 73 months, BD: M  <72 months) and all failed the Sally-Ann ToM test.
For each task, participants were awarded three scores. The first score indicated 
whether they avoided a commission error for the occluded handle (omit handle: yes = 1, 
no = 0). The second score indicated whether they included the visible decorative or 
contextual feature, namely, the stripes on the mug (include stripes: yes = 1, no = 0), the 
pattern on the teapot (include pattern: yes = 1, no = 0), the saucer in the cup-and-saucer 
task (include saucer: yes = 1, no = 0), and the flowers in the cup-and-flowers task 
(include flowers: yes = 1, no = 0). The third score (depict stripes, depict pattern, depict 
saucer, depict flowers) indicated how accurately they depicted the decorative or
contextual feature (scores ranging from 0 for ‘feature absent’ to 1 for ‘feature depicted 
realistically’). In the cup-and-saucer task, for example, depicting the saucer at the base of 
the cup earned a higher score than depicting the saucer as a circle around the cup. Details 
of the scoring procedures for indicating the realism of the decorative/contextual features 
are described in Appendix D.
Tables 8 to 11 present group means for drawing accuracy in the striped mug task, 
the teapot task, the cup-and-saucer task, and the cup-and-flowers task respectively, in 
each case derived from those participants who produced the relevant drawing. For each 
task, the first mean represents the proportion of participants who omitted the occluded 
handle, the second mean represents the proportion of participants who depicted the 
visible decorative or contextual feature, and the third mean represents proportional 
accuracy for depicting the decorative or contextual feature in a realistic way.
Table 8. Group means of proportional drawing accuracy in the striped mug task
Omit handle Include stripes Depict stripes
Control .22 .93 .89
Autistic .65 .89 .84
Down's .27 .82 .73
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Table 9. Group means of proportional drawing accuracy in the teapot task
Omit handle Include pattern Depict pattern
Control .22 .41 .35
Autistic .59 .53 .53
Down ’s .31 .62 .42
Table 10. Group means of proportional drawing accuracy in the cup-and-saucer task
Omit handle Include saucer Depict saucer
Control .41 .89 .62
Autistic .59 .94 .66
Down s .57 .71 .32
Table 11. Group means of proportional drawing accuracy in the cup-and-flowers task
Omit handle Include flowers Depict flowers
Control .58 .93 .72
Autistic .65 .94 .83
Down’s .67 1.0 .57
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Table 12 presents the mean results for the four drawing tasks, shown separately 
for each group. The first mean represents proportional accuracy for omitting the occluded 
handle across all completed drawings (omit handle), the second mean represents 
proportional accuracy for depicting the decorative or contextual feature across all 
completed drawings (include other), and the third mean represents proportional accuracy 
for portraying the decorative and contextual features realistically (depict other).
Table 12. Group means of proportional drawing accuracy across all four tasks
Omit handle Include other Depict other
Control .35 .79 .64
Autistic .62 .84 .71
Down’s .46 .78 .49
These tables reveal that for all groups and all drawing tasks a sizeable proportion 
of children incorrectly depicted the occluded handle. There was therefore widespread 
evidence of intellectual realism. In contrast, participants usually included visible 
decorative or contextual information in their drawings. The main exception to this trend 
was the teapot task for which it was common for children to omit the decorative pattern 
(circle or triangle) above the spout. Such omissions were most apparent for the control 
group, with only about a third of the sample choosing to depict the pattern.
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Finally, Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to see whether children 
who avoided commission errors for occluded handles tended also to achieve realistic 
depictions of (1) decorative details, and (2) contextual information. At least in the latter 
case, it seems reasonable to expect a positive association between the different aspects of 
drawing ability because the accurate depiction of contextual information required 
children to omit certain occluded details, namely, the back view of the saucer and the 
stalks of the flowers inside the cup (see Appendix D for details). For none of the groups 
was there found to be a significant positive correlation between mean scores for handle 
omissions and mean proportional accuracy for depicting the contextual information 
(control group: r = -.289; autistic group: r = .238; Down’s syndrome group: r = -.021, all 
p  values > .05). Similarly, there were no significant positive correlations between mean 
scores for handle omissions and mean proportional accuracy for depicting the decorative 
features (control group: r = .021; autistic group: r — .187; Down’s syndrome group: r = - 
.396, all p  values > .05).
In contrast, all groups showed uniformly positive correlations between scores for 
the occluded handles. For example, omitting the handle in the cup-and-saucer task was 
reliably correlated with omitting the handle in the cup-and-flowers task (control group: r 
= .677; autistic group: r = .618; Down’s syndrome group: r = .828, allp  values < .01). 
Additionally, both the control and the Down’s syndrome group showed a positive 
association between drawing accuracy for the saucer and for the flowers (control group: r 
= .504; Down’s syndrome group: r = .573, bothp  values < .05). The same trend emerged 
in the autistic group although it did not quite reach significance (r = .346,/? > .05).
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3. Chronological- and mental-age indices of drawing realism
The groups were next compared for the minimum levels of intellectual maturity 
associated with accurate performance on each drawing measure. This comparison was 
valid given that the lower limits of ability for both the verbal and non-verbal tests were 
similar across the groups (BPVS: control group = 36 months, autistic group = 32 months, 
Down’s syndrome group = 34 months; RCPM: all groups = 36 months). Visual realism 
was evaluated in terms of the avoidance of commission errors for occluded handles, the 
accurate portrayal of decorative features (the stripes on the mug and the pattern on the 
teapot), and the accurate portrayal of contextual information (the saucer and the flowers). 
As discussed in Section B, the realistic portrayal of contextual information required that 
children omit certain hidden but non-defining details.
Tables 13 to 15 present the results for the control group, the autistic group, and 
the Down’s syndrome group respectively. Each table shows the minimum levels of 
intellectual maturity associated with success versus failure at (1) correctly omitting all 
occluded handles (pass versus fa il handle), (2) accurately depicting the stripes on the 
mug (pass versus fa il stripes), (3) accurately depicting the pattern on the teapot (pass 
versus fa il pattern), (4) accurately depicting the saucer in the cup-and-saucer task (pass 
versus fa il saucer), and (5) accurately depicting the flowers in the cup-and-flowers task 
(pass versus failflowers). For each measure, children were deemed to be successful if 
they achieved the maximum possible score for drawing realism (see Appendix D).
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Table 13. Minimum (and mean) levels of chronological and intellectual maturity
associated with aspects of drawing realism in the control group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass handle 55 39 84 -
(N=4) (63.8) (61.8) (94.5)
Fail handle 43 36 36 -
(N= 22) (62.7) (56.9) (65.9)
Pass stripes 50 36 36 -
(N = 23) (64.2) (58.4) (69.4)
Fail stripes 43 44 42 -
(N=4) (53.8) (50.0) (68.3)
Pass pattern 55 36 42 -
(14= 8) (59.4) (47.6) (63.0)
Fail pattern 43 38 36 -
II (64.0) (61.2) (71.8)
Pass saucer 55 53 36 -
(N=2) (56.0) (60.5) (42.0)
Fail saucer 43 36 36 -
(14-25) (63.2) (56.9) (71.4)
Pass flowers 55 41 36 -
II (66.9) (62.8) (66.8)
Failflowers 43 36 36 -
II (59.2) (52.6) (71.2)
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Table 14. Minimum (and mean) scores of chronological and intellectual maturity
associated with different aspects of drawing realism in the autistic group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass handle 118 48 93 74
(N=7) (164.4) (99.7) (116.6) (95.7)
Fail handle 88 32 36 74
(1V = 8) (140.5) (64.1) (92.3) (93.3)
Pass stripes 88 32 36 74
•o'
'"iII& (145.2) (81.4) (105.0) (92.2)
Fail stripes 116 35 36 86
(N = 4) (143.3) (50.5) (84.0) (92.0)
Pass pattern 96 32 48 74
(N =9) (163.0) (93.6) (107.3) (91.3)
Fail pattern 88 33 36 74
(N = 8) (125.1) (64.6) (101.6) (94.7)
Pass saucer 154 112 111 82
(N = 4) (179.0) (123.8) (126.8) (107)
Fail saucer 88 32 36 74
*•“■1II
&
(139.1) (62.5) (97.2) (87.8)
Pass flowers 96 40 72 74
(N=I3) (147.4) (88.4) (115.0) (96.3)
Fail flowers 88 32 36 74
(N = 5) (140.8) (49.2) (78.0) (81.0)
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Table 15. Minimum (and mean) scores of chronological and intellectual maturity
associated with different aspects of drawing realism in the Down’s syndrome group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Pass handle 102 39 78 -
(N= 1) (102.0) (39.0) (78.0)
Fail handle 129 42 36
(N=7) (167.9) (63.0) (56.1)
Pass stripes 118 42 36 -
(N=7) (166.3) (58.7) (57.9)
Fail stripes 102 34 36 -
(N -  4) (113.0) (49.0) (46.5)
Pass pattern 102 39 36 -
(N=3) (158.7) (47.3) (52.0)
Fail pattern 107 34 36 -
ll (152.7) (56.0) (51.3)
Pass saucer - - - -
(N = 0) (-) (-) (-)
Fail saucer 102 34 36 -
ll (150.5) (52.6) (50.4)
Pass flowers 112 34 36 -
(N= 3) (153.0) (57.7) (67.0)
Fail flowers 102 34 36 -
’'-■
I
ll (150.7) (51.2) (45.8)
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As can be seen, at least some participants in each group managed to avoid 
commission errors for the occluded handles at a young verbal age (i.e., 3 to 4 years). In 
contrast, such success was linked with a relatively high level of performance on the 
RCPM test (i.e., equivalent to a mental age of at least 7 years in the control and autistic 
groups and at least 6.5 years in the Down’s syndrome group). Accurate depiction of the 
stripes on the mug and the pattern on the teapot did not appear to demand high levels of 
intellectual maturity and the minimum age-equivalent scores associated with visually 
realistic drawing in this respect were 3 to 4 years for both the BPVS and RCPM tests in 
all groups. Similarly, minimum verbal and non-verbal mental ages associated with 
accurate depiction of contextual information were only 3 to 4 years in the control group. 
In contrast, whereas neither the autistic nor Down’s syndrome children found it difficult 
to accurately portray the flowers, they performed poorly at depicting the saucer. None of 
the Down’s syndrome group drew a realistic saucer and the only autistic children to attain 
success on this measure had BPVS and RCPM age-equivalent scores of at least 9 years.
Next, data for the striped mug and teapot tasks were inspected in greater detail to 
determine the mean and minimum levels of intellectual maturity associated with overall 
visual realism, that is, correct omission of the handle and accurate portrayal of the 
decorative feature. Drawings that were not visually realistic were classified as showing 
either intellectual realism or symbolism using Barrett and Light’s (1976) scheme. Barrett 
and Light argued that intellectual realism denotes the depiction of all the identifying 
features of the drawing model whereas symbolism denotes the selective depiction of 
generic features. Thus, intellectually realistic drawings were those portraying both the
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handle and the decorative attribute whereas symbolic drawings were those portraying 
only the handle.
Tables 16 to 18 show results for the control, autistic, and Down’s syndrome 
groups respectively. The incidence of symbolism, intellectual realism (IR) and visual 
realism (VR) for the mug task was as follows: control group = 7% vs. 70% vs. 22%; 
autistic group = 15% vs. 15% vs. 70%; Down’s syndrome group = 0% vs. 50% vs. 40%. 
The incidence of symbolism, intellectual realism and visual realism for the teapot task 
was as follows: control group = 52% vs. 22% vs. 7%; autistic group = 21% vs. 24% vs. 
29%; Down’s syndrome group = 29% vs. 15% vs. 8%. Note that some drawings were 
unclassifiable, either because both the handle and the decorative information were 
omitted or because the decorative information was included but not accurately portrayed.
Table 16. Minimum (and mean) scores of chronological and intellectual maturity 
associated with symbolism, IR and VR for the mug and the teapot in the control group.
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Mug Symbolism 43 (51.5) 50 (50.5) 48 (70.5) -
Mug IR 50 (62.8) 36 (56.7) 36 (62.3) -
Mug VR 58 (69.0) 39 (64.6) 84 (94.8) -
Teapot Symbolism 43 (62.5) 45 (61.1) 36 (67.2) -
Teapot IR 55 (59.8) 36 (49.7) 42 (61.0) -
Teapot VR 58 (58.0) 39 (41.5) 54 (69.0) -
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Table 17. Minimum (and mean) scores of chronological and intellectual maturity
associated with symbolism, IR and VR for the mug and the teapot in the autistic group.
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Mug Symbolism 116 (145.0) 41 (63.0) 90 (100.5) 86 (96.0)
Mug IR 88 (108.8) 33 (43.0) 36 (75.0) 74 (80.0)
Mug VR 97 (158.5) 32 (91.9) 48 (113.2) 74 (94.4)
Teapot Symbolism 114 (144.7) 56 (94.0) 72 (112.0) 86 (110.0)
Teapot IR 96 (145.5) 32 (52.3) 48 (85.0) 74 (80.0)
Teapot VR 154 (177.0) 97 (118.4) 96 (120.6) 74 (100.4)
Table 18. Minimum (and mean) scores of chronological and intellectual maturity 
associated with symbolism, IR and VR for the mug and the teapot in the Down’s 
syndrome group.
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Mug Symbolism - - -
Mug IR 143 (174.3) 42 (61.5) 36 (59.5) -
Mug VR 118 (118.0) 42 (42.0) 48 (48.0) -
Teapot Symbolism 112 (138.0) 34 (54.3) 36 (59.0) -
Teapot IR 186 (187.0) 48 (51.5) 36 (39.0) -
Teapot VR 102 (102.0) 39 (39.0) 78 (78.0) -
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Tables 16 to 18 reveal that the attainment of overall visual realism tended to be 
associated with higher levels of verbal and non-verbal ability than non-realistic drawing. 
However, intellectual realism was not reliably associated with higher levels of verbal and 
non-verbal ability than symbolism. For both the mug and teapot tasks, all groups showed 
higher mean RCPM age-equivalent scores for participants who demonstrated symbolism 
than for participants who demonstrated intellectual realism. For the mug task, BPVS age- 
equivalent scores were higher for participants who demonstrated symbolism as opposed 
to intellectual realism in both the autistic group and the Down’s syndrome group. For the 
teapot task, BPVS age-equivalent scores were higher for participants who demonstrated 
symbolism as opposed to intellectual realism in both the control and the autistic groups.
The analyses described so far have been concerned with identifying the minimum 
levels of intellectual functioning associated with different kinds of drawing realism. The 
next set of analyses aimed to examine the broader relations between intellectual maturity 
and children’s drawing skills. Pearson correlation coefficients were calculated to 
determine the association between the aspects of mean drawing performance described in 
section 2 (i.e., omissions of the handle, inclusions of decorative or contextual features, 
and the realism with which decorative or contextual features were depicted), and 
chronological age, BPVS scores, RCPM scores and, for the clinical groups, BD scores. 
The correlation coefficients were calculated separately for each group and the results are 
presented in Tables 19 to 21.
74
Table 19. Correlations between intellectual maturity and mean drawing accuracy: Control
group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Omit handle .066 .203 .464** -
Include other .162
00or -.260 -
Depict other .375** .167 -.199 -
*p<.  10 **/?<.05 ***/?< .01 (2-tail)
Table 20. Correlations between intellectual maturity and mean drawing accuracy: 
Autistic group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Omit handle .251 .501** .423* .219
Include other .321 .334 -.073 .026
Depict other .569** .537** .251 .257
*p<. 10 **p<.05 ***p< .01 (2-tail)
Table 21. Correlations between intellectual maturity and mean drawing accuracy: 
Down’s syndrome group
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Omit handle -.475 -.274 -.297 -.041
Include other .108 .170 .066 .141
Depict other .663** -.006 .307 .323
*/><.10 **/?<.05 ***/? < .01 (2-tail)
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Tables 19 to 21 reveal group differences in the relations between the various 
measures of intellectual maturity and children’s ability to avoid commission errors for the 
occluded handles. Whereas drawing accuracy on this measure was best predicted by the 
RCPM scores in the control group it correlated more highly with BPVS scores in the 
autistic group. In the Down’s syndrome group, by contrast, none of the tests of cognitive 
ability were linked with visual realism on this measure. Instead, there was a tendency for 
the more able (and older) participants to make more commission errors than the less able 
(and younger) participants.
A more consistent picture emerges when considering predictors of the ability to 
portray decorative or contextual features in a realistic way, with all three groups showing 
a significant positive correlation between chronological age and success on this measure. 
The autistic group additionally showed a significant positive correlation between BPVS 
scores and the ability to depict decorative and contextual information. Whereas the same 
trend failed to appear in the control group, inspection of the individual task results 
suggests a reason for this discrepancy. For the control group, BPVS scores showed a 
positive correlation with the depiction of decorative/contextual details in both the cup- 
and-saucer task (r = .541, p  < .01) and the cup-and-flowers task {r = .493, p  < .05). In 
contrast, for the teapot task, superior depiction of the decorative feature was negatively 
associated with BPVS scores (r = -.498, p  < .05). When the preceding correlations were 
recalculated for the control group to exclude the teapot task, ‘depict other’ scores showed 
a reliable association with both BPVS scores (r = .527, p  < .01) and chronological age (r 
= .510, p c . O l ) .
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To determine whether drawing skills were related to performance on the Sally- 
Ann ToM test, measures of drawing accuracy averaged across all tasks were compared 
for children who passed versus failed the test, separately for each group. Results are 
shown in Tables 22 to 24. For each table, the first mean represents proportional accuracy 
for omitting the occluded handles (omit handle), the second mean represents proportional 
accuracy for including the decorative and contextual features (include other), and the 
third mean represents proportional accuracy for portraying the decorative and contextual 
features realistically (depict other).
Table 22. Mean proportional drawing accuracy in the control group as a function of 
performance on the Sally-Ann ToM test.
Omit handle Include other Depict other
Pass ToM .33 .76 .65
Fail ToM .40 .82 .63
Table 23. Mean proportional drawing accuracy in the autistic group as a function of 
performance on the Sally-Ann ToM test.
Omit handle Include other Depict other
Pass ToM .84 .92 .78
Fail ToM .43 .77 .65
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Table 24. Mean proportional drawing accuracy in the Down’s syndrome group as a 
function of performance on the Sally-Ann ToM test.
Omit handle Include other Depict other
Pass ToM .30 .77 .53
Fail ToM .53 .79 .47
For each group, independent-samples t tests were carried out to compare the 
means of the ‘pass’ versus ‘fail’ groups on each measure (controlling the type-1 error rate 
across the three comparisons at p  = .05). Whereas there were no significant effects of 
ToM in the control or Down’s syndrome groups, participants in the autistic group who 
passed the ToM test performed significantly better at omitting occluded handles than 
those who failed the ToM test (t (16) = 2.46, p  < .01 1-tail).
4. The effects of functional context on children’s commission errors
Another aim of the present investigation was to see whether children’s ability to 
avoid a commission error for the occluded handle of a mug or cup was affected by the 
functional context of the model. To this end, results were compared for the mug task (i.e., 
no context), the cup-and-saucer task (i.e., appropriate context), and the cup-and-flowers 
task (i.e., misleading context). It was predicted that if children were concerned with 
whether the contextual feature conveyed accurate information about the identity of the 
model then they should be least likely to make commission errors in the cup-and-saucer 
task and most likely to make commission errors in the cup-and-flowers task.
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This prediction was not confirmed for the control group. Although the incidence 
of drawing realism varied markedly across the three tasks, the differences were not in the 
expected direction and accuracy was lowest in striped mug task, at an intermediate level 
in the cup-and-saucer task, and highest in the cup-and-flowers task. Of the total sample, 
the proportion of children that omitted the handle was .22 in the striped mug task, .41 in 
the cup-and-saucer task, and .58 in the cup-and-flowers task (see Tables 5, 7, & 8). Of 26 
children who drew all three mug/cups, the proportion that omitted the handle was .23 in 
the striped mug task (SD = .43), .39 in the cup-and-saucer task (SD = .50) and .58 in the 
cup-and-flowers task (SD = .50). These results were analysed using Cochran’s Q test for 
nominal data. It was found that the frequency of commission errors differed reliably 
across the three drawing tasks, Cochran (2=13.56, df= 2 ,p< .0 \ .
The same trend was evident in the Down’s syndrome group. Of the total sample, 
the proportion of children that omitted the handle was .27 in the striped mug task, .57 in 
the cup-and-saucer task, and .67 in the cup-and-flowers task (see Tables 5, 7, & 8). Of 9 
children who drew all three mug/cups, the proportion that omitted the handle was .22 in 
the striped mug task (SD = .44), .56 in the cup-and-saucer task (SD = .53) and .67 in the 
cup-and-flowers task (SD = .50). Again, Cochran’s Q test found that the functional 
context reliably affected the frequency of commission errors, Cochran Q = 6.50, df=2,p  
<.05.
In contrast, there was no effect of functional context on the likelihood that the 
autistic group achieved visual realism. Of the total sample, the proportion of children that
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omitted the handle was .65 in the striped mug task, .59 in the cup-and-saucer task, and 
.65 in the cup-and-flowers task (see Tables 5, 7, & 8). Of 15 children who drew all three 
mug/cups, the proportion that omitted the handle was .67 in the striped mug task (SD = 
.49), .53 in the cup-and-saucer task (SD = .52) and .67 in the cup-and-flowers task (SD = 
.49). When Cochran’s Q test was applied to the latter data it found no significant effect of 
task on drawing accuracy, Cochran Q = 2.00, df= 2,p>  .05.
Data were further examined to determine whether children’s sensitivity to 
contextual information depended on their intellectual maturity. Accordingly, the 
frequency of commission errors for the occluded handle in the various mug/cup tasks was 
compared for children with high versus low scores on each measure of intellectual 
maturity (i.e., a median split), separately for each group.
In the control group, there was a reliable increase in commission errors from the 
striped mug task to the cup-and-saucer task to the cup-and-flowers task in all cases. Thus, 
the trend appeared for children with low BPVS scores (2 vs. 2 vs. 6; Cochran Q = 8.00, df  
= 2,p <  .05), high BPVS scores (4 vs. 8 vs. 9; Cochran Q = 8.40, df= 2 ,p<  .05), low 
RCPM scores (0 vs. 3 vs. 5; Cochran Q = 7.60, df= 2,p <  .05), and high RCPM scores (6 
vs. 7 vs. 10; Cochran Q = 6.50, df= 2,p<  .05). Similarly, the effect was evident whether 
children failed the Sally-Ann test (2 vs. 5 vs. 6; Cochran Q = 6.S0i df=2ip <  .05) or 
passed the Sally-Ann test (4 vs. 5 vs. 9; Cochran Q = 8.40, df=2,p<  .05).
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Similarly, sensitivity to functional context was evident in the Down’s syndrome 
group for both high and low levels of intellectual maturity, although significantly so only 
for participants who attained low RCPM scores (1 vs. 4 vs. 4; Cochran Q = 6.00, df= 2,p  
< .05) or low Block Design scores (1 vs. 4 vs. 4; Cochran Q = 6.00, df= 2,p <  .05).
There was a marginal effect for children with high BPVS scores (0 vs. 2 vs. 3; Cochran Q 
= 4.67, df= 2, p  < . 10) and for those who failed the Sally-Ann test (1 vs. 3 vs. 4; Cochran 
Q = 4.67, df= 2,p<  .10).
In the autistic group, the manipulation of functional context was ineffective in 
producing a change in the frequency of commission errors regardless of whether children 
showed inferior or superior performance on any of the measures of intellectual maturity 
(low BPVS scores: 3 vs. 2 vs. 4; high BPVS scores: 7 vs. 6 vs. 6; low RCPM scores: 3 vs. 
2 vs. 3; high RCPM scores: 7 vs. 6 vs. 7; fail Sally-Ann test: 4 vs. 3 vs. 4; pass Sally Ann 
test: 6 vs. 5 vs. 6; low Block Design scores: 4 vs. 3 vs. 4; high Block Design scores: 6 vs. 
5 vs. 6).
5. The Draw-A-Person Test
The Draw-A-Person test was completed by all participants in the control group, 
all participants in the Down’s syndrome group, and 17 of 23 participants in the autistic 
group. Drawing maturity was scored using the Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Person test 
critieria (Harris, 1964). A summary of these criteria is presented in Appendix E. A 
repeated-measures ANOVA found that the Draw-A-Person age-equivalent scores for the
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control group (M = 62.4 months, SD = 17.3; mean standardized score = 107.5) were in 
line with their chronological age, F  (1, 26) = .004, p  > .05, their BPVS age-equivalent 
scores, F  (1, 26) = 2.64, p  > .05, and their RCPM age-equivalent scores, F  (1, 26) = 1.66, 
p  > .05. In contrast, Draw-A-Person age-equivalent scores for the autistic group (M=
97.4 months, SD = 52.5; mean standardized score =81.2) were significantly impaired 
relative to their chronological age, F  (1, 14) = 10.63, p  < .01, and significantly superior to 
their BPVS age-equivalent scores, F  (1, 14) = 5.56, p  < .05. However, there was no 
significant deviation from either their RCPM age-equivalent scores, F  (1, 14) = .019, p  > 
.05 or their Block Design age-equivalent scores, F ( l ,  14) = 1.12, p  > .05. Finally, Draw- 
A-Person scores in the Down’s syndrome group (M= 46.0 months, SD = 15.8; mean 
standardized score = 62.5) were significantly impaired relative to their chronological age, 
F  (1, 14) = 95.01, p  < .001, but did not differ reliably from either their BPVS age- 
equivalent scores, F ( l ,  14) = 1.51,/? > .05 or their RCPM age-equivalent scores, F ( l ,
14) = .480,/? >.05.
Data were also examined to determine whether children’s drawing maturity as 
gauged by the Draw-A-Person test was positively correlated with their chronological and 
mental age. As can be seen in Table 25, Draw-A-Person scores showed reliable positive 
associations with BPVS scores in all three groups. These correlations held up even when 
the effects of age were partialled out (control group: r -  .357, p  < . 10 2-tail; autistic 
group: r = .519,p  < .05 2-tail; Down’s syndrome group: r = .582,p  < .05 2-tail).
Similarly, controlling for the effects of age, there was a reliable correlation between
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Draw-A-Person scores and RCPM performance in the Down’s syndrome group {r = .462, 
p  < .10 2-tail).
Table 25. Correlations between Draw-A-Person scores and the various measures of 
intellectual maturity
Age BPVS RCPM BD
Control .512*** .550*** .225
—
Autistic .310 .544** .400 .397
Down’s -.004 .499** .450* .314
*p  < . 10 **p< .05 ***/?< .01 (2-tail)
Additionally, Draw-A-Person scores were examined as a function of performance 
on the Sally-Ann ToM test. Independent-samples t tests found no reliable difference in 
Draw-A-Person age-equivalent scores between children who passed versus failed the test 
in either the control group (63.5 versus 60.6 months; t (25) = .42,/? > .05 2-tail) or the 
Down’s syndrome group (44.4 versus 46.8 months; t (13) = -.27,/? > .05 2-tail). In 
contrast, among the autistic group, children who passed achieved significantly greater 
Draw-A-Person scores than those who failed (130.3 versus 74.4 months; t (15) = 2.49,/? 
< .05 2-tail).
Next, to see whether drawing maturity in the Draw-A-Person test was associated 
with performance in the various object-drawing tasks, correlations were calculated 
between the Draw-A-Person scores and measures of drawing realism averaged across the
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striped mug task, the teapot task, the cup-and-saucer task, and the cup-and-flowers task. 
These measures were the same as described in Section B, namely, ‘omit handle’ scores, 
‘include other’ scores, and ‘depict other’ scores. The results for each group are shown in 
Table 26.
Table 26. Correlations between Draw-A-Person scores and mean drawing accuracy for 
the object-drawing tasks
Omit handle Include other Depict other
Control .249 .073 .207
Autistic .588** .301 .387
Down's .038 -.081 .066
*/?<.10 **/?<. 05 ***/?< .01 (2-tail)
As can be seen, Draw-A-Person scores were positively associated with 
competence in the object-drawing tasks only for the autistic group and only in relation to 
children’s ability to avoid commission errors for the hidden handles. This pattern of 
results was replicated even when the effects of age were partialled out (control group: r = 
.251,/? > .10 2-tail; autistic group: r = .557,/? < .05 2-tail; Down’s syndrome group: r = 
.042,/? > .10 2-tail).
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6. Matched group analyses: Control versus autistic children
The next set of analyses compared the incidence of drawing realism in the control 
and autistic groups using a subset of participants matched as closely as possible on 
mental age. Given that the groups were selected to produce mental-age distributions with 
similar means and variability, it was additionally of interest to re-examine the relations 
between intellectual maturity and drawing accuracy in each case. Because it proved 
impossible to achieve a reasonable sample size by attempting to match the groups 
simultaneously on verbal and non-verbal mental age, analyses were conducted first on 
groups matched for BPVS scores and then for groups matched on RCPM scores.
Groups matched on BPVS scores
Two groups of 11 participants each were created by matching control and autistic 
children for their BPVS performance on a one-to-one basis (i.e., matched to within 6 
months). An independent-samples 7-test confirmed that the groups failed to differ 
significantly in their mean BPVS age-equivalent scores (control M  — 50.8, autistic M = 
50.1; t (20) = .12 ,p >  .05). Similarly, Levene’s test for equality of variances found no 
significant group difference (control SD = 12.2, autistic SD = 15.0; F -  .114,/? > .05). 
The autistic children attained significantly higher scores than the control group for both 
chronological age (131.9 versus 58.1; t (20) = -7.46,/? < .05) and RCPM age-equivalent 
performance (94.1 versus 70.6 t (20) = -2.00, p  < .05). However, a test of the difference 
between proportions found that their performance on the Sally-Ann ToM test was
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marginally worse (.27 versus .64; z = 1.74,/? < .08 2-tail). Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients calculated between the different measures of intellectual maturity found that 
age was positively associated with RCPM scores in the control group (r = .652,/? < .05) 
and that RCPM scores were positively associated with BD scores in the autistic group (r 
= .691, p  < .05).
The question of whether the matched groups differed in drawing realism was 
addressed by comparing their mean proportional accuracy on each of the drawing 
measures, controlling the type 1 error rate at .05 across the entire set of comparisons! No 
significant differences emerged either for the occluded handles (control M  = .45, autistic 
M -  .45), the stripes on the mug (control M  = .86, autistic M =  .77), the pattern on the 
teapot (controlM=  .50, autisticM -  .30), the saucer (controlM  = .43, autisticM  = .54), 
or the flowers (control M  = .64, autistic M  = .73). Additional analyses comparing the 
groups for their overall visual realism at depicting the striped mug and the teapot likewise 
produced no significant outcomes (mug: control M =  .30, autistic M =  .50; t (20) = -1.05; 
teapot: control M =  .20, autistic M  = .00; t (20) = 1.42, bothp  values > .025). These 
findings confirm the conclusion drawn earlier in relation to the results for the entire 
sample that the autistic children showed no precocious drawing realism.
Nevertheless, when the results of the individual mug/cup drawing tasks were 
compared it was again found that the null effect of group in relation to overall handle 
omissions concealed a task-dependent group difference. In the control group, there was a 
reliable increase in commission errors from the mug task (M  = .27) to the cup-and-saucer
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task (M = .36) to the cup-and-flowers task (M= .82), Cochran Q = 10.33, df= 2,p<  .01. 
In contrast, this trend failed to emerge in the autistic group (mug M  = .50, cup-and-saucer 
M -  .36, cup-and-flowersM -  .40), Cochran Q = 2.00, df= 2,p>  .05.
Next, correlation coefficients were calculated to determine the relations between 
intellectual maturity and drawing realism. In the control group, avoidance of commission 
errors for occluded handles showed a significant positive relation with RCPM scores (r = 
.587,/? = .05) and there was a reliable negative relation between BPVS scores and 
accuracy for portraying the pattern on the teapot (r = -.796, p  < .01). In the autistic group, 
there were no significant correlations between any of the measures of intellectual 
maturity and the measures of drawing realism. The highest positive association was 
between mean accuracy for handle omissions and RCPM scores (r = .224, p  > .05).
Finally, the groups were compared for their drawing maturity in the Draw-A- 
Person test. Although age-equivalent scores were higher in the autistic group than the 
control group (autisticM -  82.8, SD = 43.6; controlM  = 59.5, SD -  13.0), the difference 
was not reliable, t (19) = -l .70,p > .05). In the control group, Draw-A-Person scores 
showed moderate but non-significant positive correlations with chronological age (r = 
.367), BPVS scores (r = .375), RCPM scores (r = .378), and mean drawing realism for 
the occluded handles (r = .425). In the autistic group, Draw-A-Person scores showed 
moderate but non-significant positive correlations with RCPM scores (/* = .398), BD 
scores (r = .517) and mean drawing accuracy for the occluded handles (r = .361).
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Groups matched on RCPM scores
Two groups of 10 participants each were created by matching control and autistic 
children according to their RCPM age-equivalent scores on a one-to-one basis (i.e., to 
within 6 months). An independent samples /-test confirmed that the groups failed to differ 
significantly in their mean RCPM age-equivalent scores (control M  = 84.9, autistic M = 
87.3; t (18) = -20, p  > .05). Similarly, Levene’s test for equality of variances found no 
significant group difference (control SD = 26.0, autistic SD = 27.2; F  = .043, p  > .05).
The autistic children attained significantly higher scores than the control group for 
chronological age (145.3 versus 64.6; t (18) = -6.87 ,p <  .05) whereas a test of the 
difference between proportions showed that they performed marginally worse on the 
Sally-Ann ToM test (controlM =  .80, autisticM  = .40; z = 1.83, p -  .06 2-tail). Although 
there was no significant group difference in BPVS age-equivalent scores (control M = 
62.8, autistic M=  60.2, / (18) = .25, p  > .05), Levene’s test for equality of variances 
revealed significantly greater standard deviation in the autistic sample (control SD =13.4, 
autistic SD = 30.1; F=  5.483,/? < .05).
Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated between the different measures of 
intellectual maturity found that age was significantly associated with BPVS scores in the 
control group (r = .631, p  < .05) and that RCPM scores were significantly associated with 
BD scores in the autistic group (r = .696, p  < .05).
A series of t tests was used to compare the performance of the groups on the 
various measures of drawing realism, controlling the overall type-1 error rate at .05. 
There were no significant group differences in mean accuracy for avoiding commission 
errors for the occluded handles (control M  = .45, autistic M  = .48), or for depicting either 
the stripes on the mug (control M  = .90, autistic M =  .75), the saucer (control M  = .73, 
autistic M  = .68) or the flowers (control M  = .80, autistic M  = .77). However, the autistic 
group significantly outperformed the control group at depicting the pattern on the teapot 
(control M — .05, autistic M  = .56; t (18) = -2.90,/? = .01). When overall visual realism 
was evaluated for the striped mug and the teapot, the groups achieved similar results 
(striped mug: control M  = .50, autistic M  = .50; teapot: control M  = 0, autistic A /= .10, 
bothp  values > .025)
I Despite the fact that the groups failed to differ significantly in the overall
i
i
! frequency of commission errors in the mug/cup tasks, however, there was again evidence
that only the control group were sensitive to the contextual information. There was a 
marginally significant effect of task in the control group (mug M  = .40, cup-and-saucer M  
= .50, cup-and-flowersM  = .70; Cochran Q = 4.67, df  -  2,p <  .10) but not the autistic 
group (mug M  = .44, cup-and-saucerM  = .33, cup-and-flowersM  = .55; Cochran Q -  
2.00, d f — 2,p > .10).
I
I
i
I
For neither group were there any significant correlations between the measures ofii
drawing accuracy and intellectual maturity. Nevertheless, the control group showed a
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marginally significant negative relation between BPVS scores and accuracy for 
portraying the pattern on the teapot (r = -.589, p  < . 10 2 tail).
Finally, data were examined to determine whether the groups differed in their 
mean levels of drawing maturity in the Draw-A-Person test. Although age-equivalent 
scores were higher in the autistic than the control group (autistic M -  86.7, SD = 52.2; 
controlM =  64.8, SD = 20.9), the difference was not significant, t (17) = -1.22,/? > .05).
In the control group, Draw-A-Person scores showed a marginally significant positive 
correlation with BPVS scores (/* = .580,/? < .10). In the autistic group, Draw-A-Person 
scores showed significant positive correlations with chronological age (r = .659, p  = .05) 
BPVS scores (r = .713, p  < .05) and mean accuracy at portraying occluded handles (r = 
.151, p  < .05).
7. The effects of gender on children’s drawing skills: The control group
In line with the general population of autism sufferers, the present sample of 
autistic children comprised mainly boys. The final set of analyses therefore examined the 
results for the control group separately for males (N = 16) and females (N = 11) to see 
whether the gender imbalance within the autistic sample could account for, first, their 
insensitivity to functional context, and second, their superior depiction of the pattern on 
the teapot.
When the results of the individual mug/cup drawing tasks were compared for each 
gender there was found to be a task-dependent shift in the frequency of commission
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errors for both the boys and the girls. For the boys, drawing realism for the occluded 
handle improved reliably from the mug task {M— .27) to the cup-and-saucer task (M= 
.40) to the cup-and-flowers task (M= .60), Cochran Q = 7.60, df= 2,p  < .05. For the 
girls, there was likewise a reliable decrease in commission errors from the mug task {M -  
. 18) to the cup-and-saucer task (M= .36) to the cup-and-flowers task (M= .55), Cochran 
Q = 6.00, df= 2,p<  .05.
Drawing performance for the pattern on the teapot was similarly unaffected by 
gender. Boys and girls did not differ in their propensity to include the pattern in their 
drawing (boysM= .38, girlsM =  .45; t (25) = -.40,/? > .05 2-tail), nor in the realism with 
which they depicted the pattern (boysM =  .69, girlsM =  .73; t (25) = -.1 \ ,p  > .05 2-tail). 
Importantly, both groups showed a negative relation between BPVS scores and accuracy 
for portraying the pattern on the teapot (boys r = -.604, p  < .05 2-tail; girls r = -.487, p  < 
.10 2-tail).
Additional analyses found that, among the control group, boys and girls failed to 
differ significantly in their chronological age (boys A /= 63.7, girlsM =  61.1;/ (25) = .66, 
p  > .05), their mean BPVS age-equivalent scores (boys M  = 56.9, girls M  = 57.5; / (25) = 
-.12,/? > .05) or their mean RCPM age-equivalent scores (boys M  = 64.7, girls M  = 75.8; 
t (25) = -1.25, p  > .05). However, a test of the difference between proportions found that 
marginally fewer boys than girls passed the Sally-Ann ToM test (.50 versus .82; z = - 
1.69,/? < .10 2-tail). Pearson’s correlation coefficients calculated between the different 
measures of intellectual maturity found that age was positively associated with BPVS
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scores for the boys (r = .729, p  < .01) and with RCPM scores for the girls (r = .610,/? < 
.05). In neither group was there a reliable difference in verbal or non-verbal age between 
children who passed the Sally-Ann ToM test and those who failed the Sally-Ann ToM 
test (all p  values > .05 2-tail).
Drawing realism was also compared for boys versus girls in terms of mean 
proportional accuracy on each of the drawing measures, controlling the type-1 error rate 
at .05 across all comparisons. For the object-drawing tasks, no significant gender 
difference emerged either for the depiction of occluded handles (boysM= .36, girls M = 
.34), the depiction of decorative and contextual details (boys M =  .80, girls M  = .77), or 
the realism with which decorative and contextual details were depicted (boys M =  .62, 
girls M -  .68). Similarly, boys and girls achieved equivalent levels of performance in the 
Draw-A-Person test (boysM  = 67.1, girls M =  55.6).
Examination of the relations between intellectual maturity and drawing realism 
found that mean proportional accuracy for depicting occluded handles was reliably 
associated with RCPM scores for the boys {r = .528, p  < .05 2-tail) and showed a trend in 
the same direction for the girls (r = .441,/? > .10 2-tail). Mean proportional accuracy for 
the realistic depiction of decorative and contextual details, excluding the results for the 
pattern on the teapot, showed a reliable association with BPVS scores for both the boys (r 
= .486,p = .05 2-tail) and the girls (r = .609, p  < .05 2-tail). For the boys, it was 
additionally related to chronological age (r = .654,p  < .01 2-tail). For the boys, Draw-A- 
Person scores showed a significant positive correlation with chronological age (r = .510,
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p  < .05 2-tail) and a marginal positive correlation with BPVS scores (r = .447,/? < .10 2- 
tail). For the girls, Draw-A-Person scores showed a significant positive correlation only 
with BPVS scores (r = .613,/? < .05 2-tail). For neither group were Draw-A-Person 
scores associated with any of the other measures of drawing skill. Similarly, for neither 
group did any aspect of drawing performance differ significantly between children who 
passed versus failed the Sally-Ann ToM test (all p  values > .05 2-tail).
93
Chapter Four
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated the relations between intellectual maturity and 
drawing ability in autistic children (unselected for gifted artistic ability), children making 
normal developmental progress, and Down’s syndrome children. Intellectual maturity 
was assessed in terms of verbal age (the British Picture Vocabulary Scale), non-verbal 
age (Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices), the understanding of false belief (the Sally 
Ann test) and, for the clinical groups, central coherence (the Block Design sub-test of the 
WISC). Children’s drawing ability was evaluated by asking them to portray a series of 
inanimate objects (i.e., a striped mug, a teapot with a pattern above its spout, a cup and 
saucer, and a cup with flowers inside it), all positioned with the handle hidden from view. 
Interest centred on children’s ability to avoid commission errors for the occluded handle, 
to accurately portray visible decorative features (i.e., the stripes on the mug and the 
pattern on the teapot), and to accurately portray contextual details (i.e., the saucer and the 
flowers). Results for each group were examined to determine, first, the minimum verbal 
and non-verbal mental ages associated with success on each measure, and second, the 
strength of the relations between the various measures of cognitive ability and drawing 
realism. Additional tests were conducted to see whether the groups differed in the extent 
to which their drawing realism for a mug or cup with an occluded handle varied 
according to the functional context of the model. Finally, children’s drawing maturity 
was assessed using the Goodenough-Harris Draw-A-Person test. Participants were asked 
to draw a self-portrait, with their productions being scored in terms of the details and 
scaling expected for a generalized drawing of a person (Harris, 1964).
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1. Drawing development in autistic versus non-autistic children
Previous comparisons of drawing development between autistic and non-autistic 
children used drawing models that lacked decorative and contextual information 
(Charman & Baron-Cohen, 1993; Eames & Cox, 1994). In the present research, the 
inclusion of such information allowed a more rigorous evaluation of possible group 
differences in the links between intellectual maturity and drawing realism. Despite this 
novel approach, however, the results were consistent with past investigations in providing 
no evidence of precocious drawing skills in autism. The minimum mental age associated 
with the correct omission of all four occluded handles was marginally lower in the 
control group than the autistic group for both verbal and non-verbal measures of 
intellectual maturity (BPVS: 39 vs. 48 months; RCPM: 84 vs. 93 months). Similarly, the 
control group outperformed the autistic group at depicting decorative and contextual 
details. For both groups, the minimum BPVS age-equivalent scores for accurate depiction 
of the stripes on the mug, the pattern on the teapot, and the flowers in the teacup were 
either at or near the bottom of the range. However, the minimum BPVS age-equivalent 
score associated with success at depicting the saucer was substantially lower in the 
control group than the autistic group (53 vs. 112 months). Additionally, the autistic 
children lagged behind the control children in the minimum RCPM age-equivalent scores 
linked with drawing realism for both the saucer and the flowers (saucer: 36 vs. I l l  
months; flowers: 36 vs. 72 months). These findings strongly contradict the suggestion 
that autistic children make faster developmental progress in relation to their transition 
from intellectual to visual realism.
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The conclusion that the autistic group were developing their drawing skills at the 
normal rate is bolstered when considering the results for the Down’s syndrome group. 
Similar to the control group, the Down’s syndrome children at least matched the autistic 
children in the minimum levels of intellectual maturity associated with most measures of 
drawing realism. Indeed, the minimum verbal and non-verbal ages associated with the 
correct omission of all four occluded handles were lower in the Down’s syndrome group 
than the autistic group (BPVS: 39 vs. 48 months; RCPM: 78 vs. 93 months), as was the 
minimum non-verbal age associated with accurate depiction of the flowers (36 vs. 72 
months). Like the autistic group, however, the Down’s syndrome children found it 
difficult to achieve an accurate portrayal of the saucer and none of the participants were 
successful on this measure.
Results of the mug and teapot tasks were further inspected to determine the 
prevalence of symbolism versus intellectual realism in each group. According to Barrett 
and Light (1976), symbolism corresponds to generic depictions of objects of the kind 
described by Luquet (1927) whereas intellectual realism corresponds to drawings that 
include all attributes necessary to identify the specific model, either generic or non­
generic. Examples of both types of non-realistic drawings were uncovered in all three 
groups. Thus, children sometimes indicated the general semantic class of the model (e.g., 
by drawing a plain teapot) and other times its particular identity (e.g., by drawing a 
teapot with a pattern above its spout). In contrast to Barrett and Light’s suggestion that 
symbolism represents an earlier stage of drawing development than intellectual realism, 
there were no strong indications that symbolic drawings were associated with lower
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levels of intellectual maturity than intellectually real drawings. Instead, whether children 
tended towards symbolism or intellectual realism was influenced by the drawing model 
rather than intellectual maturity, at least in the non-autistic groups. Overall, there was 
little difference in the relative incidence of symbolism versus intellectual realism between 
the autistic and non-autistic children. For both the developmentally normal and Down's 
syndrome groups, however, intellectual realism was more prevalent than symbolism in 
the striped mug task whereas the reverse was true in the teapot task.
2. Relations between intellectual maturity and drawing realism
In all groups, the ability to avoid commission errors for the occluded handles 
depended on a relatively high level of non-verbal ability. The minimum RCPM age- 
equivalent score associated with success at omitting all four handles was 84 months in the 
control group, 93 months in the autistic group, and 78 months in the Down’s syndrome 
group. In contrast, the equivalent BPVS age-equivalent scores were 39 months in the 
control group, 48 months in the autistic group, and 39 months in the Down’s syndrome 
group. These results conform to those reported by Charman and Baron-Cohen (1993). In 
their study, children who showed visual realism differed from children who failed to 
show visual realism mainly in their non-verbal age, with there being little difference 
between the groups in terms of verbal age. Charman and Baron-Cohen noted from their 
data that drawing realism was associated with RCPM age-equivalent scores of at least 74 
months in the control group and at least 66 months in the autistic group.
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When correlation coefficients were calculated between the various measures of 
intellectual maturity and children’s drawing accuracy for the occluded handles, different 
patterns emerged across the groups. In the control group, success at avoiding commission 
errors for the occluded handles was linked only with RCPM scores. In the autistic group, 
this variable showed positive correlations with both RCPM scores and BPVS scores. In
the Down’s syndrome group, in contrast, there was no association between intellectual 
maturity and children’s success at avoiding commission errors. The failure of intellectual 
maturity to predict drawing performance in the Down’s syndrome group reflects the fact 
that, while accurate depiction of all four occluded handles depended a relatively high 
level of non-verbal ability, commission errors were prevalent among both high and low
* achievers on the various skills’ tests. A similar phenomenon was reported by Charman
\
and Baron-Cohen (1993). Whereas participants in their study who attained visual realism
i
! all had a relatively high non-verbal age, those who failed to attain visual realism
I represented a wide range of abilities. Charman and Baron-Cohen concluded that a!
|
j reasonably advanced non-verbal ability is a necessary but insufficient condition for
j
visually realistic drawing.
Charman and Baron-Cohen (1993) suggested that the reason why drawing realism 
depends on non-verbal rather than verbal age is because drawing is a visuospatial skill.I
However, the present investigation found that neither verbal nor non-verbal capabilities
I!
were strongly predictive of drawing accuracy for decorative and contextual details. 
Instead, with the exception of the saucer in the cup-and-saucer task, participants in all 
groups achieved an accurate depiction of the decorative and contextual information at
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low levels of verbal and non-verbal maturity. Similarly, participants in the control group 
achieved visual realism for the saucer in the cup-and-saucer task with relatively poor 
performance on the skills’ tests although success was better predicted by verbal than non­
verbal age. Cognitive indices of drawing accuracy for the saucer could not be evaluated 
in the Down’s syndrome group because none of the children achieved visual realism on 
this measure. Among the autistic group, drawing accuracy for the saucer was linked with 
high levels of attainment on both the BPVS and RCPM tests.
Whereas successful depiction of decorative and contextual attributes did not 
appear to demand high levels of intellectual maturity on the whole, Pearson correlation 
coefficients revealed significant, positive relations with chronological age in all three 
groups. The autistic group additionally showed a significant positive association between 
their BPVS scores and drawing accuracy for decorative and contextual information, a 
pattern that also emerged in the control group with the exception of the pattern on the 
teapot. Consistent with this evidence that different skills underpinned children’s portrayal 
of the occluded handles and their portrayal of other kinds of features, correlation analyses 
found no association between the different measures of drawing ability. In none of the 
groups was children’s ability to avoid commission errors for occluded handles predicted 
by their accuracy at depicting either the decorative or contextual attributes. This was 
despite the fact that the system for scoring children’s portrayal of contextual information 
awarded higher scores to those participants who avoided depicting hidden details, 
namely, the rear of the saucer and the stalks of the flowers inside the cup. In contrast, 
children’s accuracy at depicting the occluded handles was positively correlated across
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tasks and, similarly, their ability to accurately portray the saucer in the cup-and-saucer 
task was positively correlated with their ability to accurately portray the flowers in the 
cup-and-flowers task.
These findings raise the question of why different aspects of children’s drawing 
skills were dissociated. Possibly, the answer lies in the extent to which different drawing 
tasks demand sustained visual attention for producing visual realism. Sutton and Rose 
(1998) suggested that whether young children avoid a commission error when attempting 
to depict a cup or mug with an occluded handle depends on how effectively they attend to 
the model. They studied the looking habits of 6 to 8 year olds who were asked to draw a 
mug with its handle hidden from view and found that children who drew realistically 
showed a greater overall looking time and more frequent glances at the model than 
children who included the handle. In contrast, the latter group tended to glance at the 
model only at the beginning of the drawing process. Sutton and Rose’s findings suggest 
that, in the present study, sustained attention was important for the accurate depiction of 
an occluded handle but not for the accurate depiction of decorative and contextual 
attributes. Assuming this to be true, the reason why children’s ability to avoid 
commission errors was linked with higher RCPM scores might be that superior 
performance on the RCPM test depends on the efficient allocation of attention. That is, 
participants with superior powers of visual attention might have found it easier both to 
detect critical visual information that allowed them to solve the matrices problems and to 
look long enough at the drawing models to produce a realistic depiction of them.
Conversely, whether children achieved visual realism for decorative and 
contextual features might have depended more on their memory capabilities, knowledge 
and motor skills than visual attention. The positive association between chronological age 
and the portrayal of such features could thus reflect the fact that there are improvements 
in cognitive and motor processes as children grow older. Similarly, the contribution of 
verbal ability to the accurate depiction of decorative and contextual details, at least in the 
control and autistic groups, could be explained by the idea that language development 
depends to some extent on memory and learning. Another reason why verbal skills were 
correlated with aspects of drawing realism might be because of their pivotal role in 
planning and problem solving during early childhood (i.e., the idea of private speech, 
Vygotsky, 1986). Consistent with this view, evidence implicates an important role of 
strategies in drawing development (Thomas, 1995).
On the other hand, the fact that the control group showed a significant, negative 
association between BPVS scores and their depiction of the pattern on the teapot seems 
incongruent with the notion that verbal ability is linked with planning skills. That is, it is 
unclear why superior verbal age was not associated with greater competence on this 
measure. One possibility is that verbal capabilities influence children’s ability to reason 
about the problems of portraying containment. Taylor and Bacharach (1982) found that 
young children were reluctant to depict a decorative feature when it was positioned 
within the boundaries of another object. They suggested that children assumed this 
arrangement would be perceived by a naive observer as representing one object inside 
another. Participants in the control group, at least those with superior verbal intelligence,
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might thus have feared that depicting the pattern would falsely give the impression of an 
object inside the teapot.
In addition to verbal and non-verbal age, participants were assessed for their 
understanding of false belief using the Sally-Ann test. Gopnik et al. (1994) suggested that 
an awareness of perceptual misrepresentation might be an important precursor of the 
understanding of false belief. It was thus conjectured that children who reliably avoided 
commission errors for the occluded handles would show better performance on the Sally- 
Ann test than children who drew unrealistically. Among the non-autistic groups, results 
for the Sally-Ann ToM test were not associated with drawing skills. However, the results 
for the autistic group seem consistent with Gopnik et al.’s view given that these children 
were more likely to achieve a realistic depiction of the occluded handles when they 
passed the Sally-Ann ToM test than when they failed. On the other hand, this association 
might merely reflect the relations between the understanding of false belief and general 
cognitive functioning. In the autistic group, success on the ToM measure was reliably 
greater among the older and more cognitively mature participants.
There was similarly little evidence that children’s drawing skills were influenced 
by their drive for central coherence. Central coherence has been defined as “the everyday 
tendency to process incoming information in its context -  that is, pulling information 
together for higher level meaning” (Happe, 1999, p. 217). If a person’s expectations 
about the environment distort their perception of reality then it follows that superior 
drawing ability should be linked with a weak drive for central coherence (Pring et al.,
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1995). In the present investigation, central coherence was measured in the clinical groups 
using the Block Design test of the WISC. Whereas performance on this test showed 
positive correlations with the depiction of decorative and contextual details in both the 
autistic and the Down’s syndrome groups, as well as with the ability to avoid commission 
errors for the occluded handles in the autistic group, these associations did not reach 
significance. The present findings might indicate that central coherence is predictive of 
drawing ability only in adults. On the other hand, the Block Design test might not be a 
sensitive measure of central coherence for young children or participants with low 
intellectual ability or, alternatively, central coherence might influence subtler aspects of 
drawing competence than were assessed here such as attention to local detail and the 
ability to attain an accurate depiction of visual perspective.
Although mental age showed at least some association with drawing ability in the 
control and autistic groups, this was not true for the Down’s syndrome group. Instead, the 
Down’s syndrome group exhibited a significant relation between chronological age and 
accuracy at depicting decorative and contextual information. Indeed, in contrast to 
predictions, the results of the various skills’ tests for the Down’s syndrome children 
showed marginally negative correlations with drawing accuracy for the occluded handles. 
The more able participants were therefore less likely to achieve visual realism on this 
measure. Like the present research, previous investigations have failed to uncover links 
between mental age and drawing ability among sufferers of Down’s syndrome (Clements 
& Barrett, 1994; Cox & Maynard, 1998; Eames & Cox, 1994; Laws & Lawrence, 2001). 
Laws and Lawrence (2001) concluded that drawing skills do not develop in the normal
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way in Down’s syndrome, possibly due to the poor motor skills and visual problems that 
afflict many children with this disorder. While consistent with this conclusion, the present 
findings nevertheless should not be construed as meaning that drawing skills are 
unconstrained by intellectual maturity in Down’s syndrome. As discussed earlier, the 
ability to avoid commission errors for the occluded handles was contingent on a 
relatively high non-verbal age in the Down’s syndrome group just as for the control and 
autistic groups, despite the fact that RCPM scores were not reliably correlated with 
drawing competence.
3. The effects o f functional context on the frequency o f commission errors
Davis (1983) noted that young children were less likely to make a commission 
error when portraying a mug with an occluded handle if the model was paired with 
another mug for which the handle could be seen. She suggested that children choose to 
depict the occluded handle only when they are concerned that the model’s identity as a 
mug will otherwise be unclear. Following this line of reasoning, it was predicted that 
participants in the present study would make fewest commission errors in the cup-and- 
saucer task (because the presence of the saucer correctly indicates that the object is a 
teacup) and most errors in the cup-and-flowers task (because the presence of the flowers 
wrongly suggests that the object is a vase) with an intermediate level of accuracy in the 
striped mug task (no contextual information). This prediction was not confirmed.
Whereas there was marked variation in the incidence of commission errors across the 
different mug/cup tasks, at least in the developmentally normal and Down’s syndrome
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groups, the results were not wholly in the anticipated direction. Despite the expected 
improvement in drawing realism from the striped mug to the cup-and-saucer task, the 
highest levels of drawing accuracy emerged in the cup-and-flowers task. The results thus 
failed to support the idea that children aimed to expose the real identity of the model and, 
instead, it appears they provided sufficient detail in their drawings to preserve the 
impression of the model’s identity suggested by its contextual attributes.
Importantly, whereas there was an obvious context effect for the developmentally 
normal and Down’s syndrome groups it failed to appear for the autistic group. Instead, 
the autistic children showed no change in their propensity to make commission errors 
across the various mug/cup tasks. These findings extend the work of Charman and Baron- 
Cohen (1993) who found that, in contrast to the results reported for non-autistic children 
(e.g., Light & McEwan, 1987; Littleton & Cox, 1989), their autistic sample showed no 
improvement in the ability to depict one object partially occluding another when the 
occluded object was described as ‘hiding’. The results of the present investigation 
suggest that autistic children not only lack sensitivity to social relations crucial to 
understanding the positioning of the drawing model, they also fail to appreciate the 
significance of contextual relations that convey information about its intended function.
Charman and Baron-Cohen attributed autistic children’s difficulties with the 
‘hiding’ task to their deficits in theory of mind and the understanding of mental state 
representations. Possibly, inattention to functional context on the part of the autistic 
group in the present study could be explained in the same way. That is, whereas the non-
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autistic children might have been concerned with how their drawing would be interpreted 
by another person and motivated to depict the model in such a way as to provide logical 
consistency with its surrounding attributes, lack of a well-developed conception of mind 
in the autistic group could have meant they failed to consider the viewpoint of a naive 
observer. They therefore neglected to modify their drawing strategy for the mug/cup 
across its different presentation formats. To explore this possibility, results were 
compared for autistic children who passed versus failed the Sally-Ann test of the 
understanding of false belief. This analysis failed to uncover a context effect in either 
group and, thus, there was no evidence that context sensitivity was largely confined 
children with a better developed theory of mind. Consistent with this conclusion, a robust 
context effect emerged in both non-autistic groups irrespective of their performance on 
the Sally-Ann test. Additional analyses found that the context effect held up for both high 
and low scoring non-autistic children on the BPVS and RCPM tests but was lacking in 
the autistic children regardless of their verbal and non-verbal capabilities.
Alternatively, sensitivity to context might depend on a strong drive for central 
coherence. Whereas strong coherence could produce an integrated perception of the 
model and surrounding attributes, thus highlighting the model’s function, weak coherence 
might result in inattention to contextual information. Although such reasoning accords 
with claims that autistic individuals have a diminished capacity for perceptual integration 
(e.g., Happe, 1996), however, it was not supported by the data. When the autistic sample 
was split into high versus low achieving groups in terms of Block Design scores, there 
was no evidence of greater sensitivity to context among the poor performers. Similarly,
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the autistic group did not appear to lack central coherence in the sense of failing to link 
complex visual input with relevant prior knowledge. If this had been the case then they 
should not have made any commission errors for the occluded handles irrespective of the 
model’s context. On the other hand, it could be argued that the autistic group showed an 
attenuated effect of prior knowledge (e.g., Mitchell & Ropar, 2003). According to this 
line of reasoning, they showed normal access to meaning when confronted with the cup- 
and-saucer but impaired access when confronted with either the mug or the vase.
Another possible explanation of context insensitivity in the autistic group is 
suggested by claims that individuals with autism experience enhanced discrimination 
and, thus, diminished generalization (e.g., Plaisted, 2001). Enhanced discrimination of 
examples during concept formation might mean that autistic individuals show a steeper 
than normal typicality gradient for their semantic categories. This being the case, while 
responding in the usual way to highly typical instances (e.g., a cup and saucer as an 
instance of the ‘cup’ category) they might be less likely to accept as category members 
those instances more distant from the prototype (e.g., a striped mug as an instance of the 
‘mug’ category or a cup as an instance of the ‘vase’ category).
Finally, the results also seem compatible with the idea that autism is characterized 
by deficits in deep as opposed to shallow processing (e.g., Mottron & Burack, 2001). 
Sensitivity to contextual attributes might require deep processing in the sense of 
connecting different aspects of knowledge, consistent with suggestions that conceptual 
behaviour requires memory integration (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, & Wilson, 2003).
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This idea also accords with recent evidence of deficient conceptual integration in autism. 
Although evidence favouring a central coherence deficit in autism has largely been 
derived from perceptual procedures, some researchers have extended the concept of weak 
coherence to conceptual tasks. Joliffe & Baron-Cohen (2001) found that, relative to non- 
autistic controls, normally intelligent adults with either autism or Asperger syndrome 
exhibited deficits both in integrating sets of lie drawings to create a coherent larger 
picture and in noticing incongruent objects within meaningful scenes. They therefore 
concluded that weak coherence afflicts both perceptual and conceptual processing in 
autism.
Recent theorizing by Brock, Brown, Boucher, & Rippon (2002) agrees with this 
view. Brock et al. proposed a new version of the weak central coherence account, 
namely, the temporal binding deficit hypothesis of autism, which imputes autistic 
symptoms to a reduction in the integration of specialized local neural networks in the 
brain. Their framework suggests there are differences between autism sufferers in the 
extent of their integration deficit, with low-fimctioning individuals showing a pervasive 
deficit across both conceptual and visuoperceptual processing and high-functioning 
individuals having difficulties only with higher-level conceptual processing involving the 
coordinated action of multiple brain regions. Such arguments mean it might be premature 
to dismiss the possibility of a link between central coherence and children’s sensitivity to 
functional context during drawing. Whether a context effect emerges might reflect 
children’s central coherence at the conceptual level whereas performance on the Block 
Design test might reflect their central coherence at the perceptual level.
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Importantly, the present finding of context insensitivity in the drawing 
performance of the autistic group provides a good example of an aberrant pattern of 
results that is desirable in autism research. Mitchell and Ropar (2003) argued that 
evidence that autistic and non-autistic groups differ in their performance on a particular 
test could be attributed to unequal matching. In contrast, they claimed that a difference 
between groups in the pattern of performance across conditions would provide significant 
evidence of behaviour that is categorically autistic.
4. The Draw-A-Person test
As an additional measure of drawing maturity, participants in the present 
investigation completed the Goodenough-Hanis Draw-A-Person test (Harris, 1964). 
Interest focused on the relations between Draw-A-Person achievements and intellectual 
maturity, and between Draw-A-Person achievements and drawing realism in the mug, 
teapot, and cup tasks. Similar to the findings of Watanabe et al. (2002), Draw-a-Person 
age-equivalent scores in the autistic group lagged behind their chronological age but 
exceeded their verbal age. In contrast, results for the control and Down’s syndrome 
groups were congruent with both verbal and non-verbal ability. These findings support 
the validity of the Draw-A-Person test as a measure of cognitive functioning during 
childhood. Draw-a-Person scores were reliably correlated with BPVS performance in all 
groups and they also showed a reliable correlation with RCPM performance in the 
Down’s syndrome group. It is unclear why BPVS scores were the best predictor of Draw- 
A-Person outcomes but, as mentioned earlier, links between verbal skills and drawing
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competence might reflect the contribution of language to memory and executive function 
during childhood. The strong association between Draw-A-Person scores and intellectual 
maturity for the Down’s syndrome children might be considered surprising given that 
results for the object-drawing tasks were not similarly predicted by cognitive skills in this 
particular group. Also, an investigation by Cox and Maynard (1998) found no significant 
correlation between Draw-A-Person results and verbal maturity in Down’s syndrome 
children. Possibly, this discrepancy reflects the fact that participants in the present study 
were asked to draw a self-portrait from memory whereas participants in Cox and 
Maynard’s study were asked to draw an unknown person from imagination or from a 
model. Requesting children to produce a self portrait might have motivated them to try 
harder in the Draw-A-Person test, making it easier for them to achieve their potential.
Draw-A-Person scores showed a reliable, positive correlation with the object- 
drawing scores only in the autistic group and only in relation to children’s ability to avoid 
commission errors for the occluded handles. Importantly, this relation held up even when 
the effects of chronological age were controlled for. This could indicate that the autistic 
group tended to apply the same strategies across a variety of drawing tasks. In contrast, 
the non-autistic groups might have treated the self-portrait differently to their other 
drawings. For example, when drawing a self portrait children might have been motivated 
to produce an accurate portrayal and they might have worked hard at examining their 
memories to generate realistic details. This possibility could be evaluated in future 
research by comparing the performance of autistic versus non-autistic children on the
i l l
Draw-A-Person test given instructions to produce a self-portrait from memory versus to 
draw an unfamiliar person presented as a model.
5. Matched group analyses
As expected, the groups exhibited markedly different cognitive profiles. Given 
these differences, additional analyses were carried out that compared drawing skills in the 
developmentally normal and autistic groups using a subset of participants who were 
matched closely on intellectual maturity. The first set of analyses involved participants 
matched for verbal age (i.e., BPVS scores) and the second set of analyses involved 
participants matched for non-verbal age (i.e., RCPM scores).
The initial analyses confirmed the absence of precocious drawing development 
among the autistic sample, with the groups failing to differ significantly in any aspect of 
their drawing competence. In contrast, matching the groups on non-verbal ability showed 
that the autistic children significantly outperformed the developmentally normal children 
at depicting the pattern on the teapot. This result reflects the negative relation between 
verbal age and accuracy at depicting the pattern among the developmentally normal 
children. The process of matching the groups according to their RCPM scores necessarily 
involved the selection of high-scoring participants from the control group on both verbal 
and non-verbal capabilities. It therefore produced a sample of children who performed 
very poorly on this measure. The matched group analyses additionally confirmed that a 
task-dependent shift in the frequency of commission errors was evident only for the non-
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autistic group. As for the wider sample, the autistic group showed a similar incidence of 
such errors across the striped mug task, the cup-and-saucer task, and the cup-and-flowers 
task. These findings provide strong evidence for a real difference in sensitivity to 
contextual information between autistic and non-autistic children.
6. Analyses o f gender differences in drawing performance
Because the autistic sample was predominantly male, consistent with the general 
population of autism sufferers, results in the control group were considered separately for 
each gender. These analyses provided no support for the idea that the aspects of drawing 
performance on which the autistic group deviated from the non-autistic groups could 
have arisen as a function of differences in drawing development between boys and girls. 
There was no gender difference in any aspect of drawing realism and, more importantly, 
that boys behaved similarly to girls in their responses to both the pattern on the teapot and 
contextual attributes in the mug/cup drawing tasks. That is, unlike the autistic group, boys 
in the control group showed a reliable negative correlation between their BPVS scores 
and their ability to achieve an accurate depiction of the pattern and they showed a reliable 
decrease in commission errors for the occluded handle from the striped mug task, to the 
cup-and-saucer task, to the cup-and-flowers task. Nevertheless, the present findings do 
not rule out the possibility that the typical gender imbalance in autism might produce 
differences between autistic and non-autistic groups given drawing topics that allow for 
the expression of sex differences. Research has shown that, among normally developing
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children, boys and girls show different drawing preferences and styles (review by Cox, 
1992).
7. Conclusions and directions forfuture research
In conclusion, the present investigation contributed to knowledge about drawing 
development in autistic versus non-autistic children in three main ways. First, using novel 
drawing tasks that involved models with both generic and non-generic features it 
confirmed conclusions from previous research that autistic children without any 
exceptional artistic talent show no precocious drawing skills. Second, it produced 
important evidence that autistic children differ from non-autistic children in their 
sensitivity to the contextual attributes of the drawing model. The developmentally normal 
and Down’s syndrome children showed a reliable shift in their propensity to make a 
commission error for the occluded handle of a mug/cup across different functional 
contexts but this effect was lacking for the autistic children. Third, for both autistic and 
non-autistic children it was found that different measures of intellectual maturity 
predicted different aspects of drawing ability. Children’s ability to avoid commission 
errors for occluded handles depended on reasonably advanced non-verbal capabilities but 
the realism with which they depicted decorative and contextual details, as well as their 
self portraits, depended more on their age and verbal skills.
These findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. One obvious way 
forward is to attempt to replicate the present outcomes using a greater variety of drawing
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models. This would enable it to be seen, for example, whether the negative relation 
between verbal ability and the depiction of the pattern on the teapot shown by the control 
children holds up for different objects with different kinds of decorative features. 
Similarly, given there was little association between drawing competence and the 
understanding of false belief in the present study, future research could provide a more 
rigorous test of this hypothesized link using additional false belief tasks. It might also be 
beneficial to carry out similar tests with slightly younger children in case any relations 
| between theory-of-mind and drawing skills are detectable only at low levels of
j  intellectual maturity.
i
It would also be useful to administer standardised measures of motor ability in 
future investigations of the present kind. As already noted, Down’s syndrome is 
| characterised by motor problems that are likely to impair drawing performance (Laws &
ii
| Lawrence, 2001). One difficulty with evaluating drawing development in autism is that
i
| the task of obtaining participants who are capable of understanding the test instructions
requires selecting a sample that is advanced in chronological age relative to the non- 
j autistic comparison group. Whereas the present study produced no evidence that drawing
| realism was superior in the autistic sample, which could potentially be explained by
| better developed motor skills in older participants, it would be of interest to separate the
f
f| relations between chronological age and different aspects of drawing performance into
it
| the contributions of motor ability versus knowledge and experience.
[
i
I
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The present work could additionally be extended by evaluating context sensitivity 
in autistic and non-autistic children using alternative contextual manipulations designed 
to uncover the bases for shifts in the frequency of commission errors. For example, the 
idea that semantic categories have a steeper typicality gradient for autistic than non- 
autistic children could be tested by assessing how readily each group makes commission 
errors for the occluded handles of mugs with high versus low typicality. If autistic 
children find it harder to generalize from the category prototype then they might be less 
likely than non-autistic children to incorrectly depict the handle given a highly unusual 
example of a mug. Alternatively, the extent to which children reason about another 
person’s interpretation of their drawing could be estimated by presenting two examples of 
the model placed in different orientations (e.g., Davis, 1983). Although the latter 
approach was adopted by Eames and Cox (1994), uniformly accurate performance by the 
control group in their study made it difficult to interpret the lack of a context effect in the 
autistic group.
Autistic children could also be tested for their attention to context in object 
identification procedures. Studies of categorization by non-autistic adults have indicated 
that the semantic representations of objects include extensive contextual information. For 
example, people are quicker to identify objects when they are embedded in appropriate 
scenes (such as a chair in the context of a dining room) than when they are presented in 
isolation (Biederman, 1981), a finding that has given rise to the notion of situated 
concepts (Barsalou, 2002). It would be of interest to know whether autistic children 
exhibit equivalent contextual priming to non-autistic children and, if not, whether their
deficits are predicted by their performance on tests of perceptual or conceptual central 
coherence.
For both autistic and non-autistic children, future research could explore more 
thoroughly the reasons why children make commission errors for occluded features of the 
drawing model. As discussed earlier, false depictions of the occluded handle of a mug or 
cup have been attributed to the inefficient control of visual attention (Sutton & Rose, 
1998). This idea can account for the link between RCPM scores and the ability to avoid 
such depictions that was observed in the present study. Alternatively, children might 
incorrectly portray an occluded handle because their performance is constrained by 
automatic processes serving object recognition. Hodgson (2002) suggested that the 
characteristic view of an object (i.e., as determined by its important generic features) 
becomes preferentially represented in neural circuits. He speculated that it is easier for 
young children to show intellectual realism than visual realism because they access the 
neuronal network mediating a canonical representation more quickly than they access a 
less tightly knit network mediating unusual views. Hodgson additionally postulated that, 
because the canonical representation comes to mind first, children need to inhibit the 
canonical view to achieve drawing realism. If this suggestion is correct then the ability to 
avoid commission errors should be associated with inhibitory control, even after 
controlling for other aspects of children’s intellectual maturity. This possibility could be 
checked in future research by augmenting the present battery of cognitive skills with 
measures of executive function, particularly inhibition.
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The idea that commission errors can be understood in terms of the basic processes 
supporting object recognition also predicts that children will be unlikely to succumb to 
such errors if the occluded features of the model are not generic. At least some research 
indicates that children fail to treat all occluded details with the same importance during 
drawing. Krascum, Tregenza, and Whitehead (1996) confronted 8-year-olds with novel 
objects that had perceptually salient features. Some children received information about 
the functions of the objects whereas other children simply handled and examined the 
objects without learning their functions. When children were later asked to produce a 
view-specific drawing of the objects, positioned such that the salient features were 
occluded, those who were aware of the feature functions were more likely to make 
commission errors. In the present investigation, handles were always occluded whereas 
decorative and contextual attributes were visible from the child’s perspective. Future 
studies along the same lines could examine whether children make commission errors for 
occluded features that are merely decorative and which aspects of intellectual maturity, if 
any, predict children’s ability to avoid errors of this type. Such studies should greatly 
enhance our understanding of the shift from intellectual to visual realism during early 
childhood and possible differences in the drawing development of autistic and non- 
autistic children.
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APPENDIX A. The information and consent forms
INFORMATION SHEET 
Drawing ability in autistic and non-autistic children and its relation to measures of
cognitive functioning
Aims:
This study aims to compare drawings (objects and people) by autistic children and non- 
autistic children to see whether, and in what respects, they might differ. It will also 
investigate whether children’s drawing performance is related to their verbal and non­
verbal abilities.
Method:
First, children will be given a pre-test that assesses their understanding about view- 
specificity in pictures. Initially they will be shown a teddy, and the teddy will be placed 
on a table in front of them and turned so that it is facing away from them. Children will 
be told that they are going to see two pictures of the teddy, and that they should point to 
the picture showing the teddy as it looks from where they are sitting. They will then see 
two pictures, one showing the teddy from the front and the other showing the teddy from 
the back, and they will be asked to select the appropriate picture. Next, they will be 
shown a doll and the same task will be repeated. If a child fails to select the correct 
picture on both occasions then they will not be tested further.
Second, the children who pass the pre-test will be assessed for their verbal and non­
verbal intelligence. Verbal intelligence will be measured with the British Picture 
Vocabulary Scale. This test involves asking children to identify a series of pictures, and 
takes from 5 to 8 minutes to complete. Non-verbal intelligence will be measured with 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices and with the Block Designs Patterns Task. In the 
Raven’s Coloured Progressive Matrices test, children see a series of patterns with a piece 
missing. They are asked to select a piece (from a set of six) to make the large pattern 
complete. There are 36 patterns and the task takes about 20 minutes to complete. In the 
Block Design Patterns test, children are given a set of patterned blocks and they are asked 
to place the blocks together such that the upper surface of the arrangement displays the 
same pattern as shown in a picture. This task takes about 10 minutes to complete.
Third, children will be given a test to assess the extent to which they understand that 
other people can have different knowledge and mental viewpoints from their own. They 
will be shown two dolls called Sally and Ann. Sally has a marble which she keeps in a 
box. When Sally goes out of the room, Ann takes the marble out of Sally’s box and
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places it in her own basket. Children are asked where Sally will look for her marble when 
she comes back.
Finally, children will be asked to make a series of five drawings in random order.
i. Children will be shown a striped mug and asked to say what it is. After they have 
inspected it from all angles, the mug will be placed on a table in front of them and 
positioned so that its handle is hidden from view. Children will be asked to “draw the 
mug as it looks to you from where you are sitting”.
ii. Children will be shown two teapots. One teapot will have a green triangle above the 
spout and the other will have a green circle above the spout. The experimenter will take 
one teapot and position it on the table such that both the spout and the decorative feature 
are hidden from view. Children will then be asked to draw the teapot as it looks from 
where they are sitting.
iii. Children will be shown a teacup, and it will be placed on a saucer and 
positioned so that its handle is hidden from view. Children will then be asked 
to draw the teacup as it looks from where they are sitting.
iv. The teacup will have a flower placed inside it so that it appears to be a vase. 
Once again, the teacup will be positioned so that its handle is hidden from 
view and children will be asked to draw the teacup as it looks from where they 
are sitting.
v. Children will be asked to produce a self-portrait.
It is anticipated that, in most cases, the pre-test and the various tests of cognitive ability 
will be administered in one session and that the drawing tasks will be administered in a 
second session. However, children will be allowed to attempt the different tests at their 
own pace and they will not be pressured to continue with the tests if they do not wish to 
do so. Thus, the speed of data collection will be adapted to each child’s individual 
preference.
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Consent Form for the Drawing Study
I ........................................................... , being the parent or legal guardian
of. ............................................. , consent / do not consent (delete whichever is
inapplicable)
to my child (as named above) being tested in the drawing study.
Signature of Parent / Guardian
This consent is given on the understanding that the conditions in relation to preserving 
my child’s anonymity, as outlined in the accompanying letter, are honoured.
Signature of Parent / Guardian
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APPENDIX B. The pre-test photographs
APPENDIX C. Examples of children’s drawings
Striped mug: symbolism
Striped mug: intellectual realism
Striped mug: visual realism
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Teapot: symbolism
Teapot: intellectual realism
Teapot: visual realism
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Cup-and-saucer: symbolism /  intellectual realism
I
i
it
r
i Cup-and-saucer: visual realism
F  *  '
f
j
Cup-and-flowers: symbolism /  intellectual realism
I
Cup-and-flowers: visual realism
I
i
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Draw-A-Man:
Draw-A - Woman:
APPENDIX P . Scoring criteria for the depiction of decorative and contextual details
The stripes on the mug:
0 = missing
1 = separate from the mug
2 = depicted inside the outline of mug
The pattern on the teapot:
0 = missing
1 = outside the teapot
2 = depicted inside the outline of teapot
The saucer in the cup-and-saucer task:
0 = missing
1 = separate from cup
2 = around cup
3 = touching cup but not occluded
4 = touching cup and partly occluded
The flowers in the cup-and-flowers task:
0 = missing
1 = separate from cup
2 = in cup, but stalks or water visible
3 = in cup, contents of cup occluded
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APPENDIX E. Scoring criteria for the Draw-A-Person Test
Short Scoring Guide 
Woman Point Scale
I. Head present
3. Neck two dimensions
5. Eye detail: brow or lashes
7. Eye detail: proportion
9. Nose present
II. Bridge of nose
13. Mouth present
15.”Cosmetic Ups”
17. Both chin and forehead shown
19. Hair 1
21. Hair 111
23. Necklace or earrings
25. Shoulders
27. Elbow joint shown
29. Correct numbers of fingers shown
31. Opposition of thumb shown
33. Legs present
35. Feet 1 :any indication
37. Feet 111 rdetail
39. Shoe 11 :Style
41. Attachment of arms and legs 1
43. Clothing indicated
45. Sleeve 11
47. Neckline ll:collar
49. Waist 11
51. No transparencies in the picture
53. Garb complete without incongruities
55. Trunk present
57. Head-trunk proportion
59. Limbs: proportion
61. Location of waist
63. Motor coordination: junctures
65. Superior motor coordination
67 .Directed lines and form: breast
69. Directed lines and form: arms taper
71. Directed lines and form: facial features
2. Neck present
4. Eyes present
6. Eye detail: pupil
8. Cheeks
10. Nose:two dimensions
12. Nostrils shown
14. Lips, two dimensions
16. Both nose and Ups in two 
dimensions.
18. Line of jaw indicated
20. Hair 11
22. Hair IV
24. Arm present
26. Arms at side (or engaged in 
activity or behind back)
28. Fingers present
30. Detail of fingers correct
32. Hands present
34. Hip
36. Feet 11 proportion
38. Shoe 1 “Feminine”
40. Placement of feet appropriate to 
figure
42. Attachment of arms and legs 11
44. Sleeve 1
46. Neckline 1
48. Waist 1
50. Skirt “modeled” to indicate 
pleats or draping.
52. Gaib feminine
54. Gaib a definite “type”
56. Trunk in proportion, two 
dimensions
58. Head: proportion
60. Arms in proportion to trunk
62. Dress area
64. Motor coordination: lines
66. Directed lines and form: head 
outline
68. Directed lines and form: hip 
contour
70.Directed lines and form: calf of 
leg
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Short Scoring Guide
Man Point Scale.
1. Head present
3. Neck, two dimensions
5. Eye detail: brow or lashes
7. Eye detail: proportion
9. Nose present 
11 .Mouth present
13. Both nose and lips in two dimensions
15. Projection of chin shown, chin clearly differentiated 
from lower Up.
17. Bridge of nose
19. Hair 11
21. Hair IV
23. Ears present: proportion and position
25. Correct number of fingers shown
27. Opposition of thumb shown
29. Wrist or ankle shown
31. Shoulders 1
33. Arms at side or engaged in activity
35. Legs present
37. Hip 11
39. Feet l:any indication
41. Feet lll:heel
43. Feet V: detail
45. Attachment of arms and legsl 1
47. Trunk in proportion, two dimensions
49. Proportion: head 11
51. Proportion: arms 1
53. Proportion: legs
55. Clothing 1
57. Clothing 111
59. Clothing V
61. Profile 11
63. Motor coordination: lines
65. Superior motor coordination
67. Directed lines and form: trunk outline
69. Directed lines and form: facial features
71.’’Modelling” technique 
73. Leg movement
2. Neck present
4. Eyes present
6. Eye detail: pupil
8. Eye detail: glance
10. Nose.two dimensions
12. Lips: two dimensions
14. Both chin and forehead shown
16. Line of jaw indicated
18. Hair 1
20. Hair 111
22. Ears present
24. Fingers present
26. Detail of fingers correct
28. Hands present
30. Arms present
32. Shoulders 11
34. Elbow joint shown
36. Hip 1 (crotch)
38. Knee joint shown
40. Feet 11 proportion
42. Feet lV:perspective
44. Attachment of arms and legsl
46. Trunk present
48. Proportion: head 1
50. Proportion: face
52. Proportion: arms 11
54. Proportion: limbs in two 
dimensions
56. Clothing 11
58. Clothing IV
60. Profile 1
62. Full face
64. Motor coordination: junctures
66. Directed lines and form: head 
outline
68. Directed lines and form: arms 
and legs
70. ’’Sketching” technique
72. Arm movement
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